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Year: 2016 
The International Standard, Business Aircraft Operations (IS-BAO), with a Safety 
Management System (SMS) as its core element, has been widely accepted by both the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the business aviation industry as 
the mechanism to create a healthy safety culture among the business aviation operators 
who have implemented the standard.  Scholarly literature, however, has presented 
leadership as the most important factor in the creation and management of a healthy 
safety culture in organizations in general and aviation organizations in particular.  This 
study examined and compared the effects of IS-BAO progression and leadership 
performance on the perceptions of safety culture in IS-BAO-registered business aviation 
organizations.  Under the auspices of the International Business Aviation Council 
(IBAC), the 566 IS-BAO registered operations in the United States were randomly 
sampled, and 181 operators participated.  For each selected operator, the IS-BAO 
registration level and the number of years the operator was IS-BAO registered were 
obtained through IBAC.  Each of the 181 operators was provided a link to an electronic 
survey.  The survey measured respondent perceptions of safety culture and leadership 
performance through the four leadership-organizational frames as theorized by Bolman 
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and Deal (2013): structural, human resources, political, and symbolic.  A total of 980 
responses were received, of which 846 were usable and 771 actually used after 
multivariate outliers were removed.  Confirmatory factor analyses verified the safety 
culture perceptions construct and factor loading on Bolman and Deal’s frames and 
demonstrated convergent and discriminant validity.  Structural equation model (SEM) 
analysis determined the relationship between safety culture perceptions and IS-BAO 
progression was not significant (R = -.026, p = .933).  SEM analysis was also used to 
examine the relationship between safety culture perceptions and leadership performance 
in each of Bolman and Deal’s leadership frames and determined that the relationship 
between safety culture perceptions and leadership performance in the structural frame 
was positive and significant (R = .507, p = .013); the relationship between safety culture 
perceptions and leadership performance in the human resources frame was positive and 
significant (R = .505, p = .002), the relationship between safety culture perceptions and 
leadership performance in the political frame was not significant (R = .268, p = .405), and 
the relationship between safety culture perceptions and leadership performance in the 
symbolic frame was not significant (R = -.483, p = .095).  Results of this study indicated 
that IS-BAO progression did not significantly affect safety culture perceptions, but 
leadership performance, as manifested in the structural and human resources frames, did 
affect safety culture perceptions.  While the results were of limited generalizability due to 
sample size limitations, they provided scientifically derived evidence to support the 
importance of leadership in the creation and maintenance of positive safety culture in IS-
BAO-registered business aviation operations.  
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DEDICATION 
This work is dedicated to the men and women in the business aviation industry, 
an industry I have loved and served since I retired from the USAF in 2001.  In the months 
preceding my retirement from the USAF, I was enticed to join the migration to Southwest 
Airlines that many of my fellow F-16 Instructor Pilots at Luke Air Force Base were 
making, during the period when merely knowing someone who had already been hired 
was nearly a guarantee of a position there.  Instead, I opted for business aviation, and I 
have never looked back.  I like the dynamic nature of the business, the personal 
interaction with the passengers, the camaraderie I feel with my fellow crewmembers, and 
the freedom to gaze at the sky from high altitude and ponder my place in the universe.  
But most of all, I like the way leadership works in the industry.  Each flight department 
reminds me of a USAF fighter squadron with pilots, maintenance technicians, and 
scheduling personnel all focused on a single mission.  At the head of that department 
there is a leader whose sole purpose is to accomplish the mission and take care of his or 
her people.  If this work gives those in leadership positions some information to increase 
safety for their passengers and for their people, it will have succeeded beyond my wildest 
expectations.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Safety culture in the aviation industry has been an area of significant interest since 
the in-flight structural break-up of Continental Express Flight 2574 in 1991 and the 
National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) decision to make safety culture the 
exclusive topic at the U.S. National Summit on Transportation Safety in 1997 
(Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell, 2002).  In the NTSB’s report on 
the Continental Express accident, the Honorable Dr. John Lauber, an NTSB board 
member at that time, focused on leadership’s impact on safety culture and suggested that 
the probable cause of this accident included the “failure of Continental Express 
management to establish a corporate culture which encouraged and enforced adherence to 
approved maintenance and quality assurance procedures” (NTSB, 1992, p. 54). 
Since the 1990s, there have been numerous studies and analyses performed on 
aviation safety culture, but few have focused on business aviation and business aviation 
organizations, and none has examined the impact of leadership performance on safety 
culture in business aviation.  The dearth of studies focused on business aviation would 
seem to be a substantial oversight given that there are seven times the number of turbine-
powered business jet aircraft than commercial passenger jet aircraft in the United States 
and given that U.S. turbine-powered business aircraft operators have averaged over 
8,500,000 flight hours annually since 2006, while maintaining an accident/incident rate 
comparable with that of the major airlines (FAA, 2014; NBAA, 2014).  It is the 
industry’s focus on safety culture that has led to its safety record according to the 
National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), which maintains that the “business 
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aviation community is committed to the furtherance of a safety culture that is engrained 
in the people and organizations that fly business aircraft” (2014, p. 30).  If NBAA’s 
contention is accurate, then it would be useful to understand the concept of safety culture 
as it applies to business aviation and the effectiveness of the mechanism through which it 
is implemented, especially with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimates that 
the turbine-powered business aircraft fleet will grow by an additional 20,000 aircraft and 
average 12,800,000 flight hours annually between now and 2034 (FAA, 2014).   
In order to understand the impact of safety culture on aviation organizations in 
general and business aviation organizations in particular, the concept must first be 
defined.  While definitions abound in modern scholarly and professional literature, for 
purposes of this research, the following definition, developed in a study commissioned by 
the FAA and derived from a review of the concept across several industries, is perhaps 
the most comprehensive:  
Safety culture is the enduring value and priority placed on worker and public 
safety by everyone in every group at every level of an organization.  It refers 
to the extent to which individuals and groups will commit to personal 
responsibility for safety, act to preserve, enhance and communicate safety 
concerns, strive to actively learn, adapt and modify (both individual and 
organizational) behavior based on lessons learned from mistakes, and be 
rewarded in a manner consistent with these values. (Wiegmann et al., 2002, p. 8) 
Prior to Weigmann et al.’s definition, Reason (1998) examined the cultural 
composition of the organization when he summarized safety culture by using some of the 
same elements, but Reason grouped those elements into two broad categories: 
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“something an organization is (the beliefs, attitudes and values of its members regarding 
the pursuit of safety), and as something that an organization has (the structures, practices, 
controls and policies designed to enhance safety)” (p. 294).   
Safety culture in business aviation organizations requires the appropriate 
mechanism to establish and maintain it.  According to the NBAA (2014), that mechanism 
is the International Standard, Business Aircraft Operations or IS-BAO.  IS-BAO has been 
in existence for fifteen years, having been formally approved by the International 
Business Aviation Council (IBAC) in late 2001 (IBAC, 2015b).  The purpose of IS-BAO 
is: “to promote global standardization and to assist operators in establishing quality flight 
operations using best practices of business aircraft and of commercial and non-
commercial helicopter operations worldwide” (IBAC, 2015b, p. i).  As of early 2015, 
there were over 700 IS-BAO registered business jet operators worldwide (IBAC, 2015a) 
While standardized procedures and pseudo-regulatory limitations are part of the IS-BAO, 
the standard centers on a safety management system (SMS) that is consistent with 
standards prescribed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (IBAC, 
2015b).  ICAO (2013) defines an SMS as a “systematic approach to managing safety, 
including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and 
procedures” (p. 10).  IBAC (2015c) further describes an SMS as   
A system that facilitates the attainment (of) organizational goals in an effective 
and efficient manner through an integrated network of people and resources while 
reducing the possibility of harm to persons or property through a continuing 
process of hazard identification and risk management. (p. 3) 
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IS-BAO-registered operators progress through three levels or stages of 
registration as depicted in Table 1.  Initial award of IS-BAO Stage 1 registration and 
subsequent progression to Stages 2 and 3 are functions of the status and maturity of the 
operator’s SMS as evaluated by IS-BAO-certified auditors. 
 
 
Table 1 
IS-BAO Registration Stages 
Note.  Adapted from “IS-BAO: An International Standard for Business Aircraft 
Operations,” 2015, p. 1-2.  Copyright by IBAC. 
 
 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Since IS-BAO Stage 3 lists the sustainment of a positive safety culture as its 
ultimate goal, it would seem to follow that if a business aviation organization has adopted 
and implemented IS-BAO and has reached Stage 3, a safety culture congruent with that 
defined by Wiegmann et al. should be extant.  But ICAO (2013) described safety culture 
as a subset of organizational culture.  Similarly, the FAA (2010) maintained safety 
culture is an aspect of an organization’s overall culture.  Schein (2010) argued that 
Stage Timing Criteria 
1 Initial registration 
Confirms that the SMS infrastructure is established 
and that safety management activities are 
appropriately targeted.  All supporting standards 
have been established. 
2 24 months after initial registration 
Ensures that safety management activities are 
appropriately targeted and that safety risks are 
being effectively managed. 
3 24 months after Stage 2 registration 
Verifies that safety management activities are fully 
integrated into the operator’s business and that a 
positive safety culture is being sustained. 
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organizational “culture creation and management are the essence of leadership 
and…leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin” (p. 3).  Kotter (1996) wrote 
that cultural change starts with leadership.  Further, the critical relationship between 
leadership and healthy safety culture has not only been discussed in aviation safety 
literature and scholarly publications, but also across a gamut of applications from energy 
generation to health care (Exelon Corporation, 2012; Freiwald, 2013).  There seems then 
to be a possible contradiction as to whether leadership or IS-BAO has a greater effect on 
business aviation safety culture.   
 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study is to examine and compare the effects of IS-BAO 
progression and leadership performance on the perceptions of safety culture in IS-BAO-
registered business aviation organizations.   
 
Hypotheses 
Five hypotheses were necessary to examine and compare the effects of both IS-
BAO progression and leadership performance on safety culture perceptions in IS-BAO-
registered aviation organizations.  These hypotheses were tested using structural equation 
modeling (SEM).  Quantitative data was collected to measure safety culture perceptions, 
IS-BAO progression, and leadership performance.  Safety culture perceptions were 
assessed through a survey instrument that measured the perceptions of those inside the 
culture.  IS-BAO progression was assessed as a function of an organization’s IS-BAO 
stage and the years the organization had been IS-BAO registered.  Leadership 
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performance was assessed using a construct developed by Bolman and Deal (2013).  
Bolman and Deal (2013) maintained that leaders interact with their organizations through 
four distinct contexts or frames: the structural frame - how the leader attunes the 
organization’s structure to its tasks; the human resources frame - how the leader aligns 
the organization with human needs; the political frame - how the leader builds an agenda 
and power base within the organization; and the symbolic frame - how the leader creates 
meaning for the organization and those within it.  The hypotheses that the SEM tested 
were as follows:  
H10 – There is no significant relationship between IS-BAO progression and safety 
culture perceptions. 
H1A – The relationship between IS-BAO progression and safety culture 
perceptions is positive and significant. 
H20 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the 
structural frame and safety culture perceptions. 
H2A – The relationship between leadership performance in the structural frame 
and safety culture perceptions is positive and significant. 
H30 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the 
human resources frame and safety culture perceptions. 
H3A – The relationship between leadership performance in the human resources 
frame and safety culture perceptions is positive and significant. 
H40 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the 
political frame and safety culture perceptions. 
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H4A – The relationship between leadership performance in the political frame and 
safety culture perceptions is positive and significant. 
H50 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the 
symbolic frame and safety culture perceptions. 
H5A – The relationship between leadership performance in the symbolic frame and 
safety culture perceptions is positive and significant.  
 
Significance of the Study 
From a general perspective, scholarly research on any aspect of the business 
aviation industry is somewhat rare, so the mere addition of this study to the body of 
knowledge in the field can perhaps expand the foundation of scholarly research on the 
industry for more investigation to build upon.  But the specific significance of this study 
lies in the research areas examined, three areas in the realm of business aviation that have 
not been extensively studied: safety culture measurement, the evaluation of IS-BAO 
progression on safety culture development, and the evaluation of leadership performance 
on safety culture.   
 
Safety Culture Measurement.  This research utilized a survey instrument 
specifically designed to measure safety culture in business aviation organizations.  The 
instrument provided measurements of safety culture constructs that parallel the safety 
subcultures developed by Reason (1998).  Preliminary research suggests that the survey 
instrument used herein is one of very few in the industry that is targeted for business 
aviation, has been scientifically tested, and is not subject to proprietary restrictions.   
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IS-BAO Progression.  While IS-BAO registration is not mandatory in the 
business aviation industry, IS-BAO registration meets the ICAO requirement for SMS 
implementation (IBAC, 2015).  This research described the impact of IS-BAO 
progression on the perceptions of safety culture, and hence the effects of SMS 
implementation on safety culture, in business aviation operations using quantitative data, 
the first of its kind to do so.   
 
Leadership Performance.  The importance of leadership performance to 
organizational culture in general and safety culture in particular has been discussed often 
in scholarly, professional, and business aviation industry literature.  But as yet no studies 
have attempted to quantify this effect on business aviation organizations.  This research 
provided new information in this area as well.   
 
Limitations 
While random sampling was used to select operators for participation in the study, 
operators had the option of participating in the study or refusing to participate based on 
the decision of the aviation manager.  After individual invitations were sent to each of the 
566 U.S. IS-BAO-registered operators, only 181 operators elected to participate.  
Additionally, individual members of each organization selected were encouraged but not 
required to participate.  Of 2,058 possible respondents, only 980 elected to participate, 
and only 846 provided usable data.  Once multivariate outliers were removed, only 771 
responses were analyzed.  Non-response bias tests were not feasible since benchmarking 
data was not available for the population of IS-BAO-registered operators, and there was 
9 
 
no mechanism to compare the respondent variable data with non-respondent variable 
data.  Demographic factors of pre-test and current study populations were compared and 
were largely equivalent, hence it would seem that the population of respondents may not 
have differed significantly from the population of non-respondents.  Yet given the low 
number of responses, non-response bias may have impacted the results.  Further, while 
the IS-BAO progression and leadership frame variables are discrete, it is possible that the 
two variable areas were confounded in their effects on safety culture perceptions since 
often it is those in leadership positions in business aviation organizations that are 
responsible for their organization’s adoption of IS-BAO and subsequent progression 
therein.  The impact of both non-response bias and variable confounding could limit the 
generalizability of the results of this study.     
 
Delimitations 
There are many factors that affect safety culture, but this study only focused on 
the effects of IS-BAO progression and leadership performance.  Further, this study 
limited its discussion of leadership performance to that as measured through the four 
leadership-organizational frames theorized by Bolman and Deal (2013).  Finally, this 
study only targeted IS-BAO-registered operators in the United States as its sampling 
frame in order to avoid language or cultural interpretation issues in the wording of 
questions on the survey instrument.  While U.S.-registered operators comprise the 
overwhelming majority of world-wide IS-BAO operators, they do not constitute the 
entire population.  
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List of Acronyms 
AGI Adjusted Goodness-of-fit Index 
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IRB Institutional Review Board 
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NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
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SEM Structural Equation Modeling 
SMS Safety Management System 
SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The literature supporting this study comes from several topic areas, nearly all of 
which pertain to the aviation industry.  What follows is a review of the literature most 
relevant to the study on the following topics: 
1) Safety culture and organizational culture; 
2) Leadership; 
3) Organizational culture and leadership; 
4) Leadership and safety culture; 
5) Safety management systems and safety culture;  
6) The measurement of safety culture in previous studies; and 
7) The measurement of leadership perceptions in organizations.   
In addition to providing background and context for this research, the literature 
also revealed a gap in knowledge in the areas of business aviation safety culture 
measurement as well as a gap in the knowledge of the effects of IS-BAO progression and 
leadership performance on safety culture in business aviation organizations. 
 Before proceeding, a few words on the terms leadership and management are in 
order.  From a positional perspective, there are contexts where these terms are used 
interchangeably and others where they are distinctly different.  For the most part in the 
literature to follow, the terms top management and senior leader were interchangeable 
because the terms referred to positions within an organization and not the actions or 
practices of those in the positions.  In those cases, senior leader was used in the 
discussion to avoid confusion.  In some literature, however, the terms leadership and 
12 
 
management connote different positions, with leadership defining those in senior 
positions, and management defining those in middle management positions.  In these 
latter cases, both terms were retained in the discussion.      
 From a practices perspective, there have been numerous differences between 
leadership and management that have been covered extensively in modern literature.  For 
the purpose of this research, the difference between the two is taken from Schein (2010) 
where leaders are those who create and manage organizational culture while managers 
are those who act and maintain the status quo within that culture.  
 
Safety Culture and Organizational Culture 
The search for a standard definition of safety culture can be somewhat 
challenging in modern literature.  In a 2004 study, Wiegmann et al. remarked that, “there 
exists considerable disagreement among safety professionals, both within and across 
industries, as to how safety culture should be defined” (p. 117).  But later in the same 
study, the authors gleaned several commonalities in the various definitions of safety 
culture across several industries including aviation, nuclear and gas energy generation, 
off-shore energy production, road transportation, and mineral production.  Those 
commonalities are (Wiegmann et al., 2004): 
• Safety culture is a concept defined at the group level or higher that refers to the 
shared values among all the group or organization members;  
• Safety culture is concerned with formal safety issues in an organization and 
closely related to, but not restricted to, the management and supervisory systems;  
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• Safety culture emphasizes the contribution from everyone at every level of an 
organization; 
• The safety culture of an organization has an impact on its members’ behavior at 
work; 
• Safety culture is usually reflected in the contingency between reward systems and 
safety performance;  
• Safety culture is reflected in an organization’s willingness to develop and learn 
from errors, incidents, and accidents; and 
• Safety culture is relatively enduring, stable, and resistant to change. 
In one of the most commonly-referenced papers on the subject of safety culture, 
Dr. James Reason (1998) presented the importance of shared values (what is important) 
and beliefs (how things work) among employees that interact with an organization's 
structures and control systems to produce behavioral norms where safety is concerned.  
Reason also presented two treatments of safety culture: “as something an organization is 
(the beliefs, attitudes, and values of its members regarding the pursuit of safety), and as 
something that an organization has (the structures, practices, controls, and policies 
designed to enhance safety)” (1998, p. 294).   
Safety culture can also be defined simply as an organizational commitment to 
safety at all levels of operation (McCune, Lewis, & Arendt, 2011) or as a fusion of 
several safety subcultures (Table 2) per Reason (1998) and Stolzer, Halford and Goglia, 
(2008): the informed culture, the flexible culture, the reporting culture, the learning 
culture, and the just culture. 
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Table 2 
Safety Subcultures 
Note.  Adapted from “Safety Management Systems in Aviation” by A. J. Stolzer, C. 
D. Halford, and J. J. Goglia, 2008.  Copyright by A. J. Stolzer, C. D. Halford, and J. 
J. Goglia.   
 
 
 
ICAO (2013) has indicated that safety culture “encompasses the commonly-held 
perceptions and beliefs of an organization’s members pertaining to the public’s safety and 
can be a determinant of the members’ behaviour” (p. 21).  ICAO also depicted the link 
between safety culture and the culture of the organization which encompasses it, and 
argued that the comprehension of organizational culture is crucial to understanding safety 
culture (2013).  The FAA (2010) made the same link, stating that the aspect of 
organizational culture related to safety is, in fact, safety culture itself.  IBAC (2015c) 
maintained that in order to understand safety culture in an organization, one must first 
understand the organization itself.  
Guldenmund (2000) studied the relationship of safety culture to organizational 
culture extensively and, using Schein’s work on organizational culture as a framework, 
concluded that an understanding of an organization’s basic attitudes is essential to 
comprehend the organization’s safety culture and climate.  Yin (2012) examined the 
relationship between safety culture and airline employees’ organizational identity to 
Subcultures Key attribute Key behavior of members 
The Informed Culture Knowledge Know what they need to know 
The Flexible Culture Adaptation They can adapt when required 
The Reporting Culture Information They tell what happened 
The Learning Culture Growth They learn from the lessons 
The Just Culture Expectation They know what to expect 
15 
 
understand how airline employees implement SMS, and found that the loyalty factor of 
organizational identity positively and significantly predicted the performance of SMS 
through safety culture. 
Schein (2010), one of the most cited writers on the subject of organizational 
culture, defined organizational culture as: 
A pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems 
of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to 
be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct 
way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.  (p. 18) 
Schein (2010) also observed several, deep, complex, anthropological models that 
refer to a range of observable events and underlying forces, which provide more insight 
into the larger concept of organizational culture, such as:  
• Observed behavioral regularities when people interact: the language, 
customs, and traditions that evolve; 
• Group norms: the implicit standards and values that evolve in working 
groups; 
• Espoused values: the articulated publicly announced principles and values 
that the group claims to be trying to achieve; 
• Formal philosophy: the broad policies and ideological principles that 
guide a group’s actions; 
• Rules of the game: the implicit, unwritten rules for getting along in the 
organization; 
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• Climate: the feeling conveyed in a group by the physical layout, and the 
way in which members of the organization interact with each other, with 
customers, or with other outsiders; 
• Embedded skills: special competencies displayed by group members in 
accomplishing certain tasks; 
• Habits of thinking, mental models, and/or linguistic paradigms: shared 
cognitive frames that guide the perceptions, thought, and language used by 
the members of a group and are taught to new members in the early 
socialization process; 
• Shared meanings: emergent understandings that are created by group 
members as they interact with each other; 
• “Root metaphors” or integrating symbols: the ways that groups evolve to 
characterize themselves, which may or may not be appreciated 
consciously, but become embodied in material artifacts of the group; and  
• Formal rituals and celebrations: the ways in which a group celebrates key 
events that reflect important values or important “passages” by members 
such as promotion, completion of important projects, and milestones. 
 If one compares Schein’s list above with the list of safety culture definition 
commonalities from Wiegmann et al. (2004) mentioned previously, there is substantial 
correlation between the two that demonstrates the degree to which the elements of safety 
culture must be embedded in the structure of organizational culture.  Wiegmann et al. 
(2002) presented the essence of safety culture as an organizational attribute when they 
provided their formal, consolidated, definition of safety culture as:  
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the enduring value and priority placed on worker and public safety by everyone in 
every group at every level of an organization.  It refers to the extent to which 
individuals and groups will commit to personal responsibility for safety, act to 
preserve, enhance and communicate safety concerns, strive to actively learn, 
adapt and modify (both individual and organizational) behavior based on lessons 
learned from mistakes, and be rewarded in a manner consistent with these values. 
(Wiegmann et al., 2002, p. 8) 
 
Leadership 
 A search for a definition of the term leadership presents the opposite dilemma 
from that of a search for a definition of safety culture.  Finding a definition of leadership 
is relatively simple, but choosing one is difficult.  A very small sample of the existing 
literature illustrates the difficulty in narrowing one’s scope in the search for a single 
definition but provides context for the direction of this study.   
Helmrich (2015) provides thirty different definitions of leadership from business 
owners, chief executive officers, and scholars but concludes that leadership is about 
inspiring people to achieve goals.  Economy (2015) defines leadership in terms of nine 
traits to include awareness, decisiveness, empathy, accountability, confidence, optimism, 
honesty, focus, and inspiration.  Smith (1986), in his classic book on large organization 
leadership, “Taking Charge,” defines leadership in terms of a philosophy based on 20 
essential traits.   
The emphasis on leadership traits has spawned entire leadership theories based on 
those traits which are well summarized by Phillips (2012), but go beyond the scope of 
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this study.  Leadership has also been defined in terms of personality, the outcome of a 
group process, influence, and as a pattern of activities and the focus of attention and 
effort (Adamshick, 2007).  Foisy (2008) detailed the differences in what are perhaps the 
two most popular modern leadership theories, those of transactional and transformational 
leadership, in his comparison of U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy flying squadron 
commanders, and concluded there was no significant difference in the styles used by 
those in the different services.  Transactional leaders use a contingent reward system 
wherein the leader solicits accomplishment of tasks by followers through promised 
rewards, whereas transformational leaders motivate their followers using inspiration, a 
sense of vision, and passion, and by exhibiting energy and enthusiasm (Foisy, 2008).  
General and President Dwight David Eisenhower, the leader of what was arguably the 
largest military force in history, summarized transformational leadership as “the art of 
getting someone else to do something that you want done because he wants to do it, not 
because your position of power can compel him to do it” (Eisenhower, 1960, p. 108). 
Bolman and Deal (2013) reviewed much of the scholarly research on leadership in 
preparation for their own work.  They summarized the major theories on leadership as: 
• Leadership trait theory: how are leaders different? 
• Leadership style theory: how do leaders act? 
• Leadership contingency theory: how do circumstances affect leadership? 
• Leader-member exchange theory: what happens in the leader-follower 
relationship? 
• Transformational leadership theory: how do leaders transform followers? 
(Bolman & Deal, 2013, p. 340). 
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Many leadership theories focus on the leader or on the manner in which the leader 
interacts with subordinates, yet the theories do not directly address how the leader relates 
with the culture of his organization and the effect the culture has on his followers, an 
effect which goes well beyond those in the leader’s immediate circle.  Lumpé (2006) 
presented a comprehensive review of classical and modern leadership theories and 
concluded that the real difference between those theories revolves around the theories’ 
relationship to organizational culture, specifically whether the leadership style is one 
where the leader’s traits are independent of the organizational culture (the culture-free 
thesis) or whether the leader’s style is bound to the organizational culture (the culture-
bound thesis).  Lumpé (2006) concluded that the culture-bound thesis is more directly 
related to how organizations work and is a more accurate reflection of how leaders lead 
organizations.  Pater (2012) agreed, using the term cultural changemaster to describe the 
manner in which leaders are effective in organizations.  Reitsema and Watkins (2012) 
argued that the complexity of modern organizations is such that modern leadership is less 
about the personnel in positions of authority and more about the organization as a system, 
essentially making the argument that the leader’s effect on the organization’s culture is 
vital for success.   
It is the focus on leadership and organizational culture that forms the basis for 
Schein’s theories.  Schein (2010) wrote that leaders are defined through the 
organizational culture they create and that after the culture is formed, it is the culture 
itself that influences what kind of leadership is possible.  He also explained that if 
elements of the culture become dysfunctional, leaders are the only ones capable of 
making the culture change (Schein, 2010).   
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Table 3 
Bolman and Deal’s Leadership Frames 
Note.  Adapted from “Reframing Organizations” by L. G. Bolman & T.E. Deal, 2013.  
Copyright by L. G. Bolman & T.E. Deal.     
 
 
 
Bolman and Deal (2013) held that leadership has evolved over the last 100 years 
from a focus on the individual to a more complex view that focuses on the individual, the 
relationship, and the context.  They offer five propositions to capture that evolution:  
• Leadership is an activity, not a position; 
• Leadership is different from management; 
• Leadership is multilateral not unilateral; 
• Leadership is distributed evenly rather than concentrated at the top; and  
Frame Metaphor for Organization 
Central 
Concepts 
Image of 
Leadership 
Basic 
Leadership 
Challenge 
Structural Factory or machine 
Roles, goals, 
policies, 
technology, 
environment 
Social 
architecture 
Attune structure 
to task, 
technology, 
environment 
Human 
Resources Family 
Needs, skills, 
relationships Empowerment 
Align 
organization 
and human 
needs 
Political Jungle 
Power, conflict, 
competition, 
politics 
Advocacy and 
political savvy 
Develop agenda 
and power base 
Symbolic Carnival, temple, theater 
Culture, 
meaning, 
metaphor, ritual, 
ceremony, 
stories, heroes 
Inspiration 
Create faith, 
beauty, 
meaning 
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• Leadership is contextual and situated not in the leader but in the exchange 
between leader and constituents. (Bolman & Deal, 2013, pp. 344-346) 
Bolman and Deal (2013) maintained that leaders interact with their personnel and their 
organization via four leadership frames as detailed in Table 3. 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Bolman and Deal’s Reframed Leadership 
 Leadership is effective when:        Leadership is ineffective when: 
Frame Leadership is: Leadership process is: Leadership is: 
Leadership process 
is: 
Structural 
Analyst, 
Architect 
Analysis, 
Design 
Petty bureau- 
crat or tyrant 
Management by 
detail or fiat 
Human 
Resources 
Catalyst, 
Servant 
Support, 
Empowerment 
Weakling, 
pushover 
Abdication 
Political 
Advocate, 
Negotiator 
Advocacy, 
Coalition- 
building 
Con-artist, 
thug 
Manipulation, 
fraud 
Symbolic Prophet, poet 
Inspiration, 
Meaning- 
making 
Fanatic, 
charlatan 
Mirage, smoke         
and mirrors 
Note.  Adapted from “Reframing Organizations” by L. G. Bolman & T.E. Deal, 2013.  
Copyright by L. G. Bolman & T.E. Deal.     
 
 
 
Bolman and Deal (2013) also argued that leaders are more effective when they 
interact with their followers and organizations using all of the frames instead of a single 
or few frames.  In fact, they argue that a leader may have to manifest different attributes 
and use different processes to be effective in the various frames, as presented in Table 4.   
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Several scholarly articles have been written using Bolman and Deal’s frames 
model as a mechanism to evaluate leadership across different businesses or activities.  
Parry and Horton (1998) used Bolman and Deal’s approach in a case study on the 
leadership of a Midwestern University and concluded the approach fit the historical data 
they considered.  Scott (1999) used Bolman and Deal’s construct and their instrument to 
measure the effect of leadership and organizational climate on intercollegiate athletic 
departments.  He concluded the four frames were useful as descriptors of both leadership 
and organizational climate among the departments studied (Scott, 1999).  Sasnett and 
Ross (2007) conducted a frame-based study of health science program directors and 
concluded the directors were more confident of their human resource and structural skills 
and less sure of the political and symbolic skills required of leaders.  They further 
concluded the directors’ mastery of the frame-based skills were correlated with their self-
perceived effectiveness as managers and leaders (Sasnett & Ross, 2007).  Sypawka 
(2008) used Bolman and Deal’s frames to evaluate division deans within the North 
Carolina Community college system, the third largest in the nation.  He concluded the 
deans interacted with their subordinates and organizations primarily through the human 
resources and structural frames which placed much less emphasis on the political and 
symbolic frames (Sypawka, 2008). 
Phillips and Baron (2013), in a study of aviation program leaders, confirmed 
Bolman and Deal’s conclusions in an aviation context.  In their study, Phillips and Baron 
(2013) used a survey instrument constructed by Bolman and Deal to measure a leader’s 
performance in the four leadership frames as well as to measure leadership/management 
effectiveness.  Bolman and Deal’s instrument seems to be one of few surveys to measure 
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leadership performance instead of leadership traits or transactions and has been widely 
used in scholarly literature as summarized by Phillips (2012).   
 While this review has discussed many different aspects of leadership, for the 
purposes of this study, the focus will be on the effect that leaders have on their 
organizations, an effect that will be described as leadership performance.  It is that 
performance that seems to have the greatest impact on the next area to be reviewed.  
 
Organizational Culture and Leadership 
If safety culture is an element of organizational culture, as the ICAO (2013) 
states, the factors with the greatest influence on organizational culture should have a 
similar impact on safety culture.  Among the factors influencing organizational culture, 
leadership appears to be preeminent.  Schein (2010) said that organizational “culture 
creation and management are the essence of leadership and make you realize that 
leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin” (p. 3).  According to Kotter (1996), 
culture, and the vision which accompanies it, are the responsibility of leadership.  Kotter 
also emphasized that leading change in an organizational culture is an activity that takes 
considerable time and must be continually directed until the change is fully anchored in 
the culture, arguing the importance of leadership in that process (1996).  Bass and Avolio 
(1993) believed that an organization's culture develops in large part from its leadership.  
Schein (2010) argued that as an organization succeeds in accomplishing its primary task, 
the leader’s assumptions become part of the culture of the organization, and new 
members experience these cultural assumptions as a given, not as something to be 
discussed, i.e.: “this is the way we do things around here” (p. 232).  Figure 1 illustrates 
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how a leader’s actions and attitudes cause culture to be embedded in an organization’s 
personnel.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Leadership effect on organizational culture.  Adapted from “Organizational 
Culture and Leadership” by E. Schein, 2010, San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons.  
Copyright by E. Schein. 
 
 
 
In a study using Schein’s mechanisms as a template, Kelly and Earley (2009) 
concluded the actions of the leaders of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm led to its 
eventual demise.  The leaders’ focus on profit maximization infected the entire culture of 
the firm and essentially created the conditions for Andersen’s role in the Enron debacle 
(Kelly & Earley, 2009).  In a study of 32 CEOs, Giberson and his fellow researchers 
concluded that the personality traits of CEOs directly affected the traits and values of the 
organizations they led (Giberson et al., 2009).  This study was the first to correlate what 
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many had long suspected, that the cultures of organizations are reflections of those who 
lead them (Giberson et al., 2009).  
  
Leadership and Safety Culture 
Thus far the literature has demonstrated that safety culture is an element of 
organizational culture, and leadership has a major impact on organizational culture.  Now 
the relationship between leadership and safety culture may be examined, and there is an 
abundance of literature that discusses the importance of that relationship in the aviation 
industry.   
The ICAO (2013) charged those in aviation leadership positions with the 
development and promulgation of the organization’s safety policies, standard operating 
procedures, and safety resource management.  ICAO also required the appointment of an 
accountable executive with direct responsibility for a safety program’s success where its 
members and stockholders are concerned (2013).  The FAA’s safety framework echoed 
the ICAO requirements and specified that those in charge of aviation organizations are 
primarily responsible for the organization’s safety management and safety culture (FAA, 
2010).  IBAC (2015c), in its publication “SMS Tools for Business Aircraft Operators,” 
argues that organizational culture and leadership culture are primarily products of the 
leaders that create them and insists that “without leadership, safety culture is a term, a 
construct or a theory” (p. 8).  
 Flannery (2001), in a thesis describing the measurement of aviation safety culture, 
compared the elements / major factors of safety culture as discussed by several experts in 
the field.  He concluded senior leadership commitment is a key element, component, or 
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factor in every researcher’s description of safety culture and that without that 
commitment, a healthy safety culture does not exist.  
Wiegmann et al. (2004) maintained that an aviation organization’s commitment to 
safety refers to the extent to which those in leadership positions identify safety as a core 
value of the organization and guide the organization to demonstrate an enduring, positive 
attitude toward safety, even in times of fiscal austerity.  When senior leaders are 
committed, they actively promote safety in a consistent manner across all levels within 
the organization.  Senior leadership also provides adequate resources and consistently 
supports the development and implementation of safety activities as well as ensuring 
every aspect of operations, such as equipment, procedures, selection, training, and work 
schedules are routinely evaluated and, if necessary, modified to improve. 
Stolzer et al. (2008) argued positive safety culture in aviation organizations is 
generated from the top down and that those in senior leadership positions must set the 
stage through their actions.  Senior leaders must also demonstrate commitment to safety 
in all decisions they make, including directing the resources of the organization to 
address safety concerns.  Further, senior leadership must establish safety as a core value 
of the organization and acknowledge that the nature of the organization’s activities is 
high-risk and high-consequence.  Finally, trust must permeate the organization, and all 
members of the organization must believe that they will be supported by the organization 
when they make decisions in the interest of safety. 
In an article encapsulating some 30 years of research on safety climate, a concept 
that follows naturally from safety culture according to Guldenmund (2000), Zohar 
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(2010), observed that the consensus of most writers on the subject has been that leaders 
create climate and that leadership is a climate antecedent.  Further he observed: 
The relationship between leadership and safety climate has been largely explained 
as an extension of the leader’s concern for group members’ welfare.  Effective 
leaders who have established high quality relationships with their unit members 
care about their psychological welfare.  Such caring extends to physical welfare in 
situations involving heightened risk. (Zohar, 2010, p. 1519) 
Torres (2011) said in “the Coast Guard, as in other military services, the term 
command climate is often substituted for safety culture” (p. 111).  To support his 
statement, he provided a list of tasks that field commanders must be able to perform, 
derived from a review of military literature:  
• Articulate a clear vision and establish attainable goals; 
• Allow subordinates freedom to exercise initiative; 
• Establish accountability at appropriate level; 
• Show confidence in subordinates;     
• Encourage and reward prudent risk-taking; 
• Achieve high performance through positive motivation and rewards;    
• Give clear missions within boundaries of autonomy;     
• Listen to subordinates and seek ideas;     
• Demonstrate concern about the welfare of subordinates; and    
• Establish and model high ethical standards. (Torres, 2011, pp. 111-112) 
Torres (2011) also insisted that if safety culture and command climate are 
interchangeable, then a major indicator of a positive command climate (or safety culture) 
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is the credibility of the commander.  When that credibility is high, there will be increased 
reporting, trust, and confidence in the overall system and clear communications up and 
down the chain of command in the organization.   
 McCune et al. (2011) wrote that in a healthy aviation safety culture, those in 
leadership positions place strong emphasis on safety by manifesting the same behaviors 
previously discussed.  These behaviors include: 
• Understanding of hazards within the workplace,  
• Accepting criticism; 
• Remaining open to opposing views; 
• Fostering a climate that encourages feedback; 
• Emphasizing the importance of communicating relevant safety information; 
• Promoting realistic and workable safety rules; and  
• Ensuring staff are well educated and trained so that the consequences of unsafe 
acts are understood. (McCune et al., 2011)   
 Wolf (2012), in a comprehensive review of the need for SMS implementation 
throughout the aviation industry, argued that safety begins from the top in organizations, 
and called for the executives of aerospace organizations to lead the way by developing a 
safety culture that permeates each organization.  He also discussed the importance of the 
safety advisor in that process to ensure the executives have the latest information and data 
to reinforce the safety culture.      
Freiwald (2013) investigated the relationship among ethical leadership, an ethical 
workplace climate, safety culture, safety behaviors, and measured safety outcomes of 
workers in the high reliability organizations of aviation and healthcare.  His research 
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revealed that perceptions of an ethical workplace climate can yield significant impact 
upon an organization’s safety culture, while workplace perceptions of ethical leadership 
are directly related to safety outcomes.   
Finally, Cooper (2015) wrote that a company’s safety culture is driven by an 
executive leadership team that “creates, cultivates and sustains a company's journey to 
excellence” (p. 49).  Cooper believed it was the executives’ responsibility to set the 
vision and strategic direction, provide resources, and constantly emphasize and reinforce 
the importance of safety to people and the business. 
 
Safety Management Systems and Safety Culture  
Scholarly literature that discusses IS-BAO and safety culture is somewhat rare.  
But since the SMS is the core element of IS-BAO, a review of the relevant literature that 
discusses SMS and safety culture should provide a similar context to the possible impact 
of IS-BAO on safety culture. 
In one of the earliest articles written about SMS by a member of the FAA, Smith 
(2005) wrote that to be successful, an SMS must be an integrated collection of policy, 
architecture, assurance, and safety promotion.  Smith argued that safety culture was part 
of the safety promotion element of the SMS but also contended that the SMS had to be 
implemented with a safety culture in place, or it would not be successful.   
ICAO (2013) discussed the importance of safety culture and organizational 
culture in the establishment and operation of an effective SMS but did not seem to 
contend whether safety culture facilitates SMS implementation or is a product of that 
implementation.  In contrast, the FAA (2010), similar to Smith (2005), stated the 
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structural elements to create a safety culture, including safety policies, are the items 
which are most under management control and hence should be implemented first in 
order to facilitate an effective SMS.  IBAC (2015c) argued that safety culture provides 
the environment or the atmosphere in which the SMS functions.  Further, IBAC (2015c) 
insisted that “safety culture is to SMS what air is to living creatures.  If the atmosphere is 
healthy, the SMS thrives.  If the atmosphere is poisonous or non-existent, the SMS 
becomes inanimate” (IBAC, 2015c, p. 7).   
Grote (2012), in a review of safety management processes across several high-risk 
activities, condensed the implementation of safety management into two separate 
definitions.  One definition focused on arrangements made by the organization for the 
management of safety in order to promote a strong safety culture and achieve good safety 
performance.  Essentially, this definition focused on safety culture as the primary goal or 
product of safety management with the aim of achieving good safety performance.  The 
other definition emphasized an organized approach to managing safety, including the 
necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures.  In this 
definition, safety culture isn’t mentioned specifically, and safety management is seen as 
more process driven, similar to other management systems such as qualify management.  
Grote (2012) does emphasize, however, that in most of the literature he reviewed, the 
concept of safety culture is frequently evoked as both a prerequisite for and the effect of 
good safety management. 
Remawi, Bates, and Dix (2011) administered a safety culture survey to workers at 
a large international airport to measure the change in worker safety attitudes a year after 
an SMS had been introduced there.  Using another large airport with an SMS in operation 
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as a control group, the average score on the survey reported by survey respondents at the 
airport with the new SMS increased significantly in the areas of safety communications, 
safety rules, supportive safety environment, personal risk appreciation, work 
environment, and involvement while the same scores from the airport that had an SMS in 
place stayed constant.  The authors concluded that the implementation of an SMS did 
increase positive perceptions of safety culture.  
Lin (2012) conducted a study of airline pilots in Taiwan to determine the 
relationship of organizational identity, a function of organizational culture, to safety 
culture and SMS implementation.  He concluded that safety culture was strengthened as 
the result of the implementation of an SMS and that the loyalty factor of organizational 
identity positively and significantly predicted the performance of SMS through safety 
culture.  While his results indicated that SMS strengthened safety culture, Lin’s study 
used SEM and path analysis to show that SMS performance was affected by the 
employee’s loyalty to the organization and the employee’s identification with the 
organization.  According to Schein (2010), loyalty and identification are attributes of 
organizational culture and are largely leadership driven.  The impact on loyalty and 
identity in Lin’s study begs the question of whether the improvement in those areas was 
due to SMS implementation or the overall culture surrounding that implementation.   
In the only study found that focused on business aviation, McNeely (2012) 
researched the correlation between SMS implementation and organizational safety 
culture with a survey of four 14 C.F.R. Part 135 on demand charter air carrier operators.  
He concluded that the correlation between the level of SMS implementation and the level 
of organizational safety culture was positive and significant.  McNeely also concluded 
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that the level of management involvement correlated positively and significantly with the 
level of safety culture, but his study assumed that safety culture was a product of SMS 
implementation and not a precursor for that implementation.  Interestingly, while 
McNeely addressed the theory that safety culture must exist for SMS implementation to 
be effective, his study methodology did not seem to take that possibility into account.     
Freiwald, Lenz-Anderson, and Baker (2013) studied the safety culture and 
attitudes of a multi-campus, multi-national flight training organization that had 
experienced multiple hull losses and had no formal safety management system in place.  
Using a mixed methods approach incorporating survey research, they concluded that an 
effective safety culture did not exist in the organization.  They recommended the 
implementation of a safety management system to create a better safety culture in the 
organization.    
Adjekum (2014) studied safety culture perceptions as a function of SMS 
implementation in a four-year collegiate aviation program.  Using a survey instrument 
based on the Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS), he determined that 
perceptions of safety culture improved the longer personnel remained with the program 
and varied depending on the nationality of the respondent.  While he discussed the 
importance of safety culture to successful SMS implementation, he did not examine the 
effect of SMS implementation on safety culture or vice-versa.   
Woo (2015), in a case study of a small flight school organization, wrote that 
developing and maintaining a strong safety culture is a critical prerequisite for 
implementation of an SMS.  He maintained that an SMS did not create a safety culture, 
but that the safety culture provided the environment for the SMS to be effective.  
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Overall, there is some disagreement as to whether safety culture is a precursor to 
or a product of safety management system implementation in the literature reviewed.  But 
that same literature is consistent in depicting a positive relationship between safety 
culture and SMS implementation, a relationship this study will further explore in the 
context of IS-BAO implementation.   
  
Measurement of Aviation Safety Culture in Previous Studies 
 Now that the literature involved with organizational culture, leadership, safety 
culture, and safety management systems has been discussed, an examination of the 
measurement of safety culture itself is in order.  While this review is not exhaustive, it 
provides an overview of the manner in which aviation safety culture has been measured 
and reveals that business aviation safety culture measurement has largely been ignored.  
Some of the studies reviewed in the preceding section are discussed again in this section; 
however, the focus here is on the measurement and analysis mechanisms utilized by the 
researchers rather than the conclusions presented.   
Flannery (2001) discussed the measurement of safety culture in aviation, but only 
spoke to the topic in theoretical terms.  He derived definitions of safety and safety culture 
and then presented possible measurement systems, finally concluding, at that time, an 
adequate measurement tool for that measurement did not exist (Flannery, 2001). 
Gibbons, von Thaden, and Wiegmann (2006) attempted to validate a safety 
culture survey for aviation operations based on a five-factor model that included 
organizational commitment, management involvement, pilot empowerment, reporting 
systems, and accountability systems as they pertained to safety within an airline.  The 
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survey, then designated as the Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS), was 
designed around these five factors, and was distributed to pilots and managers of a large 
U.S. airline for anonymous completion (Gibbons, von Thaden, & Wiegmann, 2006).  
Results of the authors’ series of confirmatory factor analyses indicated that the original 
five-factor model of safety culture did not fit as well as hypothesized (Gibbons et al., 
2006).  The model was revised to focus on four main factors; organizational commitment, 
operations interactions, formal safety system, and informal safety system.  
 Díaz-Cabrera, Hernández-Fernaud, and Isla- Díaz (2007) evaluated a safety 
culture measurement instrument that centered on the organizational values and practices 
related to the safety management system.  They explored seven dimensions that reflected 
underlying safety meanings and the four cultural orientations in the field of safety arising 
from the competing values framework (Díaz-Cabrera et al., 2007).  The authors then 
surveyed 299 participants from five companies in different industrial sectors, only of one 
which was aviation-related.  While they admitted that their results were inconclusive, 
they noted that organizations in different industrial sectors seemed to emphasize different 
safety-related organizational values and hence, the safety cultures in each sector varied 
from its counterparts in other sectors.   
Guldenmund (2007) said that questionnaires were not particularly successful in 
measuring organizational safety culture.  He believed they focused too much on 
evaluations of those in charge and not on the basic cultural assumptions at different levels 
of the organization (Guldenmund, 2007).  Guldenmund seemed to disregard the impact of 
leadership on that culture in his 2007 study, a curious outcome given that his earlier 
research involved multiple references to Schein’s work (Guldenmund, 2000).   
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Von Thaden, Kessell, and Ruengvisesh (2008) built upon von Thaden’s earlier 
work by administering the revised four-factor CASS to the flight operations department 
of a large, major European airline.  Their analysis confirmed the existence of a positive, 
effective safety culture within the organization (von Thaden, Kessel, & Ruengvisesh, 
2008).   
Later in 2008, von Thaden and Gibbons released an FAA-funded report 
describing the measurement construct of their revised instrument, now named the Safety 
Culture Scale Measurement System (SCISMS) (von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008).  The 
authors said their instrument fused techniques to measure both organizational safety 
culture and professional safety climate in aviation organizations and provided a tool to 
measure the evolution of organizational safety culture in large commercial airlines.  
 In 2010, Kelly, Meyer, and Patankar used SEM to verify a pyramid construct of 
safety culture first proposed by Patankar and Sabin in 2008.  The pyramid consisted of 
four distinct yet interdependent layers, to wit: 
The base of the pyramid included safety values and unquestioned assumptions 
that serve as the foundation of the model.  The second layer is described as safety 
strategies and consists of leadership strategies, policies, procedures, 
organizational norms, history, legends and heroes.  The third level of the pyramid 
represented the safety climate of the organization and consists of the short and 
near-term set of attitudes and opinions surrounding safety.  The apex of the 
Pyramid represented safety behaviors and consists of individual and group safety-
related behaviors within the organization. (Kelly, Meyer, & Patankar. M., 2012, p. 
4) 
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Using data from an existing dataset from a major international carrier and 
questions selected from four different survey instruments, Kelly et al. demonstrated that a 
four-factor model based on the pyramid construct fit the data somewhat better than a 
single-factor model through confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (2012).  They then 
analyzed different groups of respondents to determine if the factor loadings on the CFA 
were higher for some groups of respondents than others, such as managers, production 
supervisors and engineers (Kelly et al., 2012).  Although the model fit all three groups 
well, it seemed to fit the managers and production supervisors better than the engineers.  
Apparently, no pilots were surveyed.   
To assess safety culture in their study of workers at two international airports, 
Remawi, Bates, and Dix (2011) used a survey instrument constructed by the authors’ 
research supervisors, largely based on the U.K. Workplace Health and Safety Culture 
Survey.  The survey used a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 
(strongly disagree).  Demographic questions were included to identify participant 
characteristics.  The survey was presented twice to personnel at the airports with a year’s 
time between each presentation.  An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on 
the data generated by the instrument to determine if the mean scores of the safety culture 
variables were significantly different for personnel at each airport after a year had passed.  
At the airport where the SMS had been in place all along, the control airport, the mean 
scores of the safety culture survey variables were not significantly different between the 
two survey presentations.  At the airport where the SMS had been newly implemented, 
the mean scores of the safety culture survey variables were significantly different 
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between the two presentations and indicated personnel felt the safety culture had 
improved.  
 Lin (2012) built a unique survey instrument for his study of airline pilots in 
Taiwan that focused on the relationship of organizational identity (essentially 
organizational culture) to safety culture and SMS implementation.  Based on interviews 
with safety managers and content analyses of the airlines safety manuals and safety audit 
reports, he constructed a 37-question survey using a 5-point Likert scale to assess the 
respondent’s attitude toward the airline’s safety culture and safety management system.  
Lin analyzed the data generated by his survey with SEM and path analysis and concluded 
that organizational identity positively impacted safety culture and SMS implementation. 
 In his research on the correlation between SMS implementation and safety 
culture, McNeely (2012) adapted a survey from Gibbons, von Thaden, and Wiegmann’s 
CASS.  His instrument was developed via field tests using the input of subject matter 
experts and featured a 5-point Likert scale for respondents to rate their perceptions of 
safety culture and safety management system effectiveness.  He concluded that the 
correlation between the level of SMS implementation and the level of organizational 
safety culture was positive and significant.  Further, he noted that the relationship 
between management commitment (leadership) and safety culture was positive and 
significant as was the relationship between safety promotion (a function of leadership-
directed safety policy) and safety culture.  While McNeely’s research provides context 
for the present study, it focused on a small number of air carrier operators and did not 
include private corporate operators.  The small number of operators surveyed, four, 
correspondingly limited the number of organizational cultures examined and hence did 
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not determine the effect of SMS implementation across a wide cross section of 
operations.   
 Freiwald, Lenz-Anderson, and Baker (2013) used Gibbons, von Thaden, and 
Wiegmann’s CASS, with a 5-point Likert scale, to collect quantitative data in their 
assessment of the safety culture of a multi-national, multi-campus flight training 
organization.  They used factor analysis to validate the constructs of the 83-item 
instrument, organizational commitment, management involvement, pilot empowerment, 
reporting systems, and accountability systems, but this portion of their analysis of the 
factor loading was somewhat inconclusive because they only received 63 responses with 
which to analyze the 83 variables.  However, their multivariate analysis of variance 
produced useable results that showed positive and significant relationships between 
attitudes toward the various safety culture elements in the CASS and respondent 
characteristics such as respondent location, gender, and position within the company.   
Adjekum (2014) studied safety culture perceptions as a function of SMS 
implantation at a four-year collegiate aviation program.  Like previous researchers, 
Adjekum used a modified and re-validated version of the CASS that he called the 
Collegiate Aviation Program Safety Culture Assessment Survey (CAPSCAS).  The 
CAPSCAS featured 62 items, each with a 5-point Likert scale and assessed respondent 
attitudes on the areas of their organization’s formal safety program, informal safety 
program, operations interaction, and organizational commitment.  Interestingly, while 
Adjekum discussed the safety subcultures developed by Reason (1998), he did not 
attempt to modify the CASS in a manner to assess those subcultures, but instead used the 
original subareas developed by von Thaden, Wiegmann, and Gibbons.  Adjekum received 
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142 usable responses from the 944-member sampling frame he developed, and conducted 
an ANOVA to determine if there were significant differences in respondent attitudes 
toward safety culture as a function of the respondent’s time in the program and whether 
the respondent was a U.S. or international student.  He concluded the longer a respondent 
spent in the program, the better the respondent’s perceptions of the safety culture, and 
U.S. students had more favorable perceptions of the safety culture than did international 
students.  
The USAF also uses survey tools to assess safety culture.  The service’s 
Combined Mishap Reduction System (CMRS) features ten safety culture surveys for 
elements of operational units such as operations and maintenance (USAF, 2012).  The 
surveys provide quantitative data using a 5-point Likert scale and also solicit 
demographic information on the respondent (USAF, 2012).   
 In summary, modified versions of von Thaden, Wiegmann, and Gibbons’ CASS, 
a tool developed to assess safety culture in large commercial operations, seems to be 
common when assessing aviation safety culture in aviation organizations that are not 
commercial in nature, including the one study of a business aviation organization 
reviewed here.  A modified version of the CASS is used to assess safety culture in this 
study and will be discussed in depth in the next chapter.    
 
Measurement of Leadership Performance in Aviation Organizations 
There have been many studies that have measured the effect of leadership and 
styles of leadership on organizations, yet surprisingly few have dealt with aviation 
organizations.   
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Lumpe (2006), in his study of leadership and organization in the aviation industry, 
used an instrument he adapted from the organizational culture assessment tool developed 
by Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research Program.  His 
instrument was designed to measure respondents’ opinions of overall organizational 
culture from within 12 different professional cultures or clusters he identified within the 
aviation industry from line technicians to flight crew to information technology 
professionals to middle and strategic management.  While Lumpe’s focus was applicable 
to the present study, the tool he used focused more on the culture itself and not 
leadership’s impact or performance on that culture.  
Foisy (2008) measured differing levels of transactional, transformational, and 
passive-avoidant leadership behaviors between USAF and U.S. Navy flying squadron 
commanders and determined there were not significant differences between the two 
groups.  The instrument he used, the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ), uses 
45 questions to assess the leadership behaviors using a 5-point rating scale.  While the 
MLQ is widely recognized as a validated instrument to measure leadership behaviors, the 
behaviors it measures, transactional and transformational leadership, focus more on the 
leader’s behavior in relationship to the subordinate and less on the leader’s behavior as it 
relates to the culture of the organization.  In his research, Foisy (2008) focused on 
leadership behaviors themselves and not leadership performance for the organization.   
Krear-Klostermeier (2012) also used the MLQ to measure the leadership styles of 
FAA air traffic control managers.  She found that the transformational style of leadership 
prevailed in her research, but she, like Foisy (2008), focused on leadership style not 
necessarily leadership performance (Krear-Klostermeier, 2012). 
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Freiwald (2013) studied the effect of ethical leadership on safety outcomes in 
high-reliability organizations in both the aviation and health care fields.  The data 
collection device he used featured 31 questions that measured leadership integrity but did 
not assess leadership performance.    
Using Bolman and Deal’s Leadership Frame Questionnaire, Phillips and Baron 
(2013) measured the effectiveness of the leaders of collegiate aviation programs as a 
function of the organizational frame in which the leader operated.  The authors chose 
Bolman and Deal’s instrument because they believed Bolman and Deal’s leadership 
construct, along with its associated instrument, was the most appropriate tool to 
accurately measure the impact of collegiate aviation program leaders on their associated 
organizations.  
Even with the few studies on aviation leadership performance located and 
discussed, a reasonable cross-section of measurement instruments have been utilized.  
Instruments have focused on various elements such as organizational culture, leadership 
traits, the ethics of leadership, and the impact of leaders on their organizations.  Hence it 
would seem that the choice of the applicable instrument is a function of the goal of the 
research or researcher. 
 
Summary 
The literature presented has manifested a few items of consensus that seem clear: 
1) Safety culture is an element of organizational culture and can be, to a degree, 
defined; 
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2) Rather than traits or actions, leadership performance, a measure of a leader’s 
effect on his or her organization, is the most applicable construct to assess for the 
purpose of this study;  
3) Leadership performance can be defined in the context of organizational culture 
and, correspondingly, organizational culture is largely a function of leadership 
performance; 
4) Safety culture, as an element of organizational culture, is also largely a function 
of leadership performance; 
5) SMS has had a favorable impact on safety culture in aviation;  
6) Most of the safety culture measurement that has taken place in the aviation 
industry has focused on commercial aviation.  Yet even the studies that have not 
concentrated on commercial aviation have used adaptations of the CASS for 
safety culture measurement.  It would seem then, that adaptions of the CASS for 
safety culture measurement outside of commercial aviation have been accepted as 
valid by scholarly writers;  
7) Most leadership measurement instruments for studies involving aviation 
organizations have not focused on leadership performance.  Bolman and Deal’s 
Leadership Frames Questionnaire is a notable exception and will be discussed in 
the next chapter; 
8) Apart from McNeely (2012), there have been no other studies found that have 
addressed safety culture or safety culture measurement in business aviation; and  
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9) There have been no scholarly studies of the effects of IS-BAO implementation or 
leadership performance on safety culture in business aviation organizations.  This 
gap in knowledge will be addressed by this study.   
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to examine and compare the effects of IS-BAO progression and 
leadership performance on business aviation safety culture, this study focused on U.S. IS-
BAO-registered operators and used a data collection instrument that measured both the 
safety culture perceptions and leadership performance as assessed by the members of 
those operations.  Data generated by the instrument was evaluated using descriptive 
statistics, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structured equation modeling (SEM).  
This research was conducted with the approval and cooperation of IBAC (Appendix H) 
as well as the approval of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University (Appendix G).  
 
Research Approach 
The variable constructs referenced in this research appear in Table 5.  
Quantitative data was collected via survey instrument and analyzed.  Analysis was 
comprised of a first order CFA on the safety culture constructs, a first order CFA on the 
leadership performance constructs, a second order CFA to test discriminant validity 
between the two constructs, and a SEM to test the hypotheses.  Standardized regression 
weights generated by the SEM were examined to determine if the hypothesized 
relationships were positive and significant.  Regression weights were also compared to 
determine which relationships might be stronger than others.  A simplified version of the 
SEM appears in Figure 2.  The full SEM appears in Appendix F.    
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Table 5 
 
Variable Constructs 
 
 
 
 
Population/Sample 
To adequately target the population of U.S. IS-BAO-registered operators, random 
cluster sampling with replacement was the initial sampling methodology envisioned.  
Vogt, Gardner, and Haeffele (2012) recommended the use of cluster sampling when a 
frame of individual respondents is not readily available.  In order to limit language and 
national cultural interpretation issues, the sampling frame was confined to the population 
of 566 IS-BAO registered operators (the clusters) based in the United States at the time of 
the study, as supplied by IBAC’s Director of IS-BAO, Sonnie Bates (personal 
communication, June 22, 2015).  Krejcie and Morgan (1970) indicated that given a 
population of 566 members to study or survey, a sample size of 229 is sufficient; hence 
229 operators were to be selected from the population for this study.  The roster of U.S.-
based IS-BAO registered operators was numbered sequentially and then randomly 
Construct Name Construct Label Construct Inputs 
Safety Culture 
Perceptions SCP Survey Variables SCP_1 - SCP_23 
IS-BAO Progression IP IS_Stage & IS_Years 
Leadership Performance 
in the Structural Frame LP_SF Survey Variables SF_1 - SF_8 
Leadership Performance 
in the Human Resources 
Frame 
LP_HRF Survey Variables HRF_1 - HRF_8 
Leadership Performance 
in the Political Frame LP_PF Survey Variables PF_1 - PF_8 
Leadership Performance 
in the Symbolic Frame LP_SYF Survey Variables SYF_1 - SYF_8 
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ordered.  Initially, the process was to involve email invitations to the aviation managers 
of each of the first randomly-selected 229 operations to ask the manager if his or her 
organization would participate.  For each aviation manager that declined, another would 
be selected further down the roster.  In actuality, due to the lack of response, individual 
invitations with embedded survey links were sent to each of the 566 aviation managers on 
the roster, with the goal of only using the first 229 organizations on the randomly-ordered 
list that chose to participate.  This methodology may have affected the randomness of the 
sampling method and, in fact, generated a sample of convenience.  Only 181 operators 
elected to participate and of those, 69 operators had only one survey respondent.  Of the 
2,058 possible participants among the 181 operators, 980 chose to participate for a 
response rate of 47.62%.   
Westland (2010) analyzed studies and approaches for the determination of the 
minimum sample size necessary to adequately evaluate a SEM and derived a formula for 
minimum sample size.  Soper (2015) implemented that formula in an online calculator to 
ascertain that minimum sample size.  Using a desired effect size of .1, the smallest effect 
/ correlation level discussed by Westland (2010), a statistical power level specified by 
convention of .8 (Soper, 2015), and the 57 observed and 10 latent variables in the SEM 
(Figure 2), the calculator generated a minimum sample size of 703 cases to detect effect, 
a minimum sample size of 160 cases to validate the model’s structure, and a 
recommended sample size of 703 cases.  This criteria was achieved by the data collected 
and analyzed. 
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Data Collection Device 
The data collection instrument used in this research (Appendix A) is composed of 
two surveys, one that measures safety culture perceptions and another which measures 
leadership performance.  The instrument was administered through the Survey Monkey 
website at www.surveymonkey.com. 
   
Safety culture instrument description.  In order to develop a tool to assess 
safety culture in business aviation operations, an instrument was devised that features 
questions adapted from a published version of the CASS (Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006),  
a question derived from Dr. James Reason’s safety culture survey (Transport Canada, 
2008), and questions derived from Stolzer et al. (2008).  An annotated version of the first 
pre-test instrument with question-by-question citations appears in Appendix B.  The 
instrument included several features that were used to optimize it for business aviation 
operators: 
• It contained questions designed to measure the five safety subcultures listed by 
Reason (1998) and Stolzer et al. (2008): the informed culture, the flexible culture, 
the reporting culture, the learning culture, and the just culture; 
• Questions were included to assess leadership performance in the context of safety 
culture; 
• Question phraseology was modified to use terms familiar to business aviation 
personnel; and 
• Survey length was limited to allow for swift completion since participation would 
be voluntary.   
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The instrument was pre-tested twice using IBM’s Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) AMOS software to assess its content and construct validity as 
well as its reliability (Broyhill, 2014).  The first pre-test used data collected from 13 IS-
BAO registered operators with 101 respondents.  An exploratory factor analysis revealed 
eight factor areas instead of six, although some of the factor areas generated could not be 
assessed adequately due to sample size limitations.  The exploratory factor analysis also 
showed that the variables that assessed leadership performance did not factor into one 
discrete area but were spread across several other measurement areas.  The instrument 
demonstrated content validity as assessed by the respondents and also demonstrated scale 
reliability in all but one measurement area, the flexible culture (Broyhill, 2014).   
The second pre-test collected data from 18 IS-BAO registered operators with 232 
respondents (Broyhill, 2014).  A revised instrument was used (Appendix C), featuring the 
five areas specified by Reason (1998) and Stolzer et al. (2008) and a leadership area.  A 
seventh area, the empowered culture, which reflects employees’ ability to change the 
organization and is closely aligned with the concept of empowered accountability as 
described by Cortés and Rogers (2013), was added as a result of the findings of the first 
pre-test.  Sample size in the second study was adequate, and after a confirmatory factor 
analysis and accompanying post hoc analyses were conducted, the revised instrument 
revealed high content validity and construct validity.  The instrument also demonstrated 
adequate scale reliability overall in all but one subarea, the flexible culture (Broyhill, 
2014).  
For the instrument used in the current study (Appendix A), survey questions 6-9 
on the second pre-test instrument (Appendix C), which measured “The Flexible Culture” 
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per Reason (1998) and Stolzer et al. (2008) were removed due to low scale reliability.  
Survey questions 28-30 on the second pre-test instrument (Appendix C), which measured 
“The Leadership Culture” were removed to prevent cross-loading on the leadership 
performance constructs.  The rating scale for respondents was changed from a 7-point 
Likert scale in the original instrument to a 5-point Likert scale to match the rating scale 
on the leadership performance measurement instrument.      
 
Safety culture instrument reliability.  The scale reliability statistics for the pre-
test of the applicable measurement areas of the safety culture assessment instrument 
appear in Table 6.  The standardized Cronbach’s alpha values show adequate scale 
reliability in all areas.  Scale reliability was assessed again in the current study using the 
same criteria.  
 
 
Table 6 
Pre-Test Safety Culture Measurement Instrument Reliability 
Note.  These reliability statistics were not published in the cited AeroSafety World article 
(Broyhill, 2014) but were produced in the research that generated the article 
 
 
 
Safety culture instrument validity.  While construct and content validity for the 
instrument were confirmed in the pre-tests, since a revised instrument was used in the 
Measurement Area  Questions α − unstandardized α − standardized 
The Informed Culture  5 .714 .730 
The Empowered Culture  4 .716 .718 
The Reporting Culture  5 .758 .763 
The Learning Culture  4 .680 .704 
The Just Culture  5 .811 .822 
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current study, additional tests for validity were required.  A first order confirmatory 
factor analysis was conducted in the current study to confirm the construct validity of the 
instrument.  Model fit, convergent, and discriminant validity were assessed as part of the 
analysis, the methodology and criteria of which is discussed later in the study. 
 
Leadership instrument description.  The decision process for a leadership 
performance measurement instrument considered two criteria.  First, the instrument had 
to actually measure leadership performance, not leadership traits.  Second, the instrument 
had to be relatively brief in order to ensure maximum voluntary participation by 
respondents.   
Denison (2015) offered the use of the Denison Survey, an instrument that 
measures organizational culture as affected by leadership performance.  Conversations 
with Mr. Ken Uehara at Denison revealed that respondents would not only have to 
complete the organizational culture survey but also complete a 360-degree survey on 
those in leadership positions, and the results from the two surveys would have to be 
correlated to measure leadership performance (personal communication, April 21, 2015).  
Although the Denison instrument has been validated through scholarly study (Denison, 
Nieminen, & Kotrba, 2014), the required survey process seemed too lengthy to ensure 
maximum participation by respondents.   
The Leadership Circle also offered the use of the Leadership Culture Survey 
which measures leadership performance across two domains, creative competencies and 
reactive tendencies (TLC, 2015).  The instrument featured 62 questions / variables and 
required the respondent to answer each item twice, once in the context of the way the 
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respondent feels the organizational leaders currently act and once in the way the 
respondent feels organizational leaders would act in the respondent’s conception of an 
ideal organization (TLC, 2015).  Further discussion with Mr. Michael O’Connor of The 
Leadership Circle revealed that the comparison between the scores generated by 
respondents’ ideas of the present organization versus those of the respondents’ ideas of 
the ideal organization provided the measure of leadership performance (personal 
communication, April 22, 2015).  While this survey offered scientifically valid and 
reliable data, the length of the questionnaire, some 124 items, seemed excessive for 
potential respondents in business aviation organizations.  Also, the alignment of the 
survey constructs did not parallel Schein’s conception of leadership performance in the 
context of organizational culture.     
Bolman and Deal’s Leadership Frames Questionnaire was the instrument that 
seemed most suitable both to the measurement of leadership performance (included in 
Instrument at Appendix A and in original form in Appendix D).  Also, since the 
instrument contained only 32 total questions, it seemed to be brief enough to ensure 
maximum participation.  Bolman and Deal’s survey is designed to specifically measure 
leadership performance across the four leadership frames theorized by the designers.  
Interestingly, while Bolman and Deal (2013) and Phillips (2012) maintain that symbolic 
frame is where the classic elements of organizational culture are found, the behavior that 
leaders use to embed culture in their subordinates and organizations per Schein (2010), 
seen in Figure 1, align well with the structural, human resources, and symbolic frames, as 
depicted in Table 7.  Bolman’s permission to use the instrument for this study appears in 
Appendix E. 
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Table 7 
Comparison of Leadership Culture Behaviors and Leadership Frames 
Leadership Culture Embedding Behavior 
Schein (2010) 
Corresponding Leadership Frame 
Bolman & Deal (2013) 
What gets paid attention to, measured, 
and controlled on regular basis Structural 
Reactions to critical incidents and 
organizational crises Structural 
How resources are allocated Political 
Deliberate role modeling, teaching and 
coaching Human Resources 
How rewards and status are allocated Political 
Who gets recruited, promoted, retired, or 
excommunicated Human Resources 
Note.  Adapted from “Organizational Culture and Leadership,” by E. Schein, 2010.  
Copyright by E. Schein.  Also adapted from “Reframing Organizations,” by L. G. 
Bolman & T.E. Deal, 2013.  Copyright by L. G. Bolman & T.E. Deal.     
 
 
 
Leadership instrument reliability.  Spearman Brown coefficients and 
Cronbach’s alpha values for each of the leadership frame areas appear in Table 8 along 
with the number of cases analyzed for each value.  Cronbach’s alpha values were 
recalculated for these four frame measurement areas in the current study.  
 
Leadership instrument validity.  In addition to Phillips (2012) and Phillips and 
Baron (2013), Bolman and Deal’s instrument has been used by the authors themselves in 
six published studies, by other authors in two books and in forty published studies, and 
by doctoral candidates in over 50 dissertations, nearly all of which deal with the 
leadership frame construct (Bolman, 2010).  These studies took place over a 20-year time 
period from 1990 to 2010 (Bolman, 2010).  In order to ensure thoroughness for this 
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study, a first order CFA was performed to assess the construct validity of Bolman and 
Deal’s instrument.  Model fit as well as convergent and discriminant validity were 
assessed.  
 
 
Table 8 
Leadership Frame Instrument Reliability Statistics 
Measurement Areas Questions Cases Spearman-Brown Cronbach α 
Structural Frame 8 1309 933 .920 
Human Resources Frame 8 1331 929 .931 
Political Frame 8 1268 911 .913 
Symbolic Frame 8 1315 937 .931 
Note.  Adapted from “Research Using Leadership Orientations Survey Instrument,” by 
L.G. Bolman, 2010.  Copyright by L. G. Bolman. 
 
 
 
Treatment of the Data 
The aviation manager for each organization that participated was provided a 
survey link at www.surveymonkey.com unique to his or her organization.  The aviation 
manager was then asked to forward the link to all of the personnel in the organization.  
Sixty-nine aviation managers did not forward the link, 112 did.  Each of the 980 
respondents participated anonymously through the assigned link.  While the Survey 
Monkey website does collect internet protocol address data, that information was 
discarded.  One question on the instrument collected demographic data on the 
respondent’s level in the organization, but no other individual information was solicited.  
While data was grouped by operator due to the issuance of separate links for each 
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organization participating, no internal matching or correlation took place once the data 
was entered into the SPSS software.   
 
Descriptive statistics.  The 57 quantitative variables generated by the instrument 
were analyzed for univariate mean, standard deviation, mode, skew, and kurtosis.  
Frequency histograms were generated to provide a visual depiction of the distribution of 
the data.  Multivariate kurtosis was also calculated. 
 
Missing Data.  The design of the instrument was such that it should have forced 
completion of all required questions once attempted by the respondent.  The design did 
not, however, prevent survey participants from exiting the survey once underway.  Of the 
980 responses received, 134 were discarded due to respondents either not agreeing with 
the informed consent statement at the beginning of the survey or partially completing the 
survey and then exiting the survey once underway.  The remaining number of usable 
responses was 846. 
 
Non-response Bias.  Non-response bias occurs when the non-response rate for a 
survey is substantial enough that those who do respond may not constitute a 
representative sample of the targeted sampling frame (Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele, 2012).  
Typically, there are three reasons for non-response in survey research: 1) potential 
respondents never receive the survey, 2) respondents cannot complete the survey because 
they don’t have the required data, or 3) respondents refuse to complete the survey 
(Groves et al., 2009).  Of these three reasons, the last one is the most difficult for 
researchers to deal with because of the potential effect on the variables of interest 
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(Groves et al., 2009).  Unfortunately, there appears to be no consolidated agreement 
among research experts as to the level of response in which non-response bias can be 
ignored, with some experts arguing that 50% response is sufficient while other maintain 
that 85% is minimally adequate (Groves et al., 2009).   
The most effective method to deal with non-response bias is for the researcher to 
do everything he or she can to maximize response and minimize non-response in the first 
place (Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele, 2012).  Mechanisms to minimize nonresponse can 
include thorough pre-test of survey instruments, avoiding rushed or short data-collection 
periods, sending reminders to potential respondents, ensuring confidentiality of 
respondents, or offering incentives to respondents (Penwarden, 2013).  For this study, 
nearly all of these mechanisms were incorporated.  The safety culture perceptions 
instrument was pre-tested twice and the leadership performance instrument was used in 
multiple scholarly studies.  The data collection period was extended from one to two 
months to ensure adequate time for response.  Multiple general reminders were sent to all 
aviation mangers from IBAC and multiple individual reminders were sent to aviation 
managers by the researcher.  Individual and organization confidentiality was emphasized 
in all communications as was the assurance that no group data for participating 
organizations would be presented.  The only incentive offered was possibility of 
contributing to the safety of the business aviation industry and to the improvement of the 
IS-BAO, both of which were emphasized by IBAC in its communication.   
Once the data was collected, nonresponse bias needed to be addressed at both the 
operator and respondent level.  Both of these tasks were challenging.  At the operator 
level, while IBAC’s sponsorship of the study made the request for operator participation 
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more official, the choice as to whether or not to participate was made by the applicable 
aviation manager.  Of the 566 U.S. IS-BAO-registered operators listed in IBAC’s roster, 
four operators’ registrations had lapsed, making them ineligible to participate.  An 
additional 13 operators were not contacted because they had either ceased operations or 
their contact information in IBAC’s database was not current.  Of the remaining 549 
operators, 181 chose to participate, and one refused to participate based on the current 
workload of the organization’s personnel.  The remaining 367 operators not only did not 
participate, but also did not respond to communications from either IBAC or the 
researcher in spite of multiple attempts at communication. 
At the individual respondent level, lack of response was assumed to be generated 
by respondent refusal to participate since the survey was distributed to respondents 
electronically via email and since nearly all members of business aviation organizations 
are required to possess and be knowledgeable in the use of computer technology.  Most 
business aviation professionals maintain dynamic schedules and travel extensively, so 
refusal to participate may have been as much a function of task prioritization as it was the 
manifestation of a particular attitude or opinion.  The phenomenon of survey burnout may 
have also contributed to respondent refusal to participate.   
Imputation of survey values for non-respondents was difficult to perform with a 
consistent methodology.  Values for non-respondents in organizations that did not 
participate could not be estimated because there is no database where the type of 
information collected by this instrument had been previously sampled.  Values for non-
respondents inside participating organizations could have been estimated, but for 69 
operators there was only one respondent for the entire organization, and the number of 
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respondents for the other 112 operators varied considerably.  Hence, the calculation of 
organizational averages as values for imputation would not have been consistent and 
could have resulted in skewed data.  
Sampling bias appears to have been limited, if present at all.  While the pre-tests 
were conducted with small, all volunteer populations of IS-BAO-registered operators 
with the encouragement of the applicable aviation manager, this study targeted the entire 
population of U.S. IS-BAO-registered operators.  There was some limited overlap 
between the two populations.  Chi-squared tests for independence were conducted on 
three demographic characteristics for the pre-test and current study populations.  The chi-
squared tests showed that the two populations were homogenous in the areas of IS-BAO 
stage (Χ2 = 3.51, p = .173) and employee levels (Χ2 = 3.35, p = .187) but were 
heterogeneous in the area of number of years IS-BAO (Χ2 = 102.68, p = .000).  This 
would seem to indicate that respondents and non-respondents, both at the organizational 
and individual levels, were not markedly different.   
 
Assumptions.  The most critical assumption for the application of multivariate 
statistical analysis techniques is that of univariate and multivariate normality and 
associated limited values of skewness and kurtosis (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 
2010).  However, where survey instruments are concerned, particularly those using Likert 
scales, both skewness and kurtosis are somewhat common (Byrne, 2010) and were 
assessed as part of the analysis.  Fortunately, the effects of non-normal distributions can 
be negligible as sample size becomes larger (Hair et al., 2010).   
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While outliers would not seem to be an issue given the expected kurtosis for 
survey instruments using Likert scales, especially the five-item Likert scale on the survey 
instrument used for this study, a standard test for multivariate outliers, the squared 
Mahalanobis distance (D2), was computed for each variable case.  Typically, an outlying 
case will have a D2 value that is distinctly different from other D2 values (Byrne, 2010).  
Using the conservative thresholds discussed by Hair et al. (2010) and Kline (2011), 75 
cases in the current study that demonstrated D2 values that were distinctly different (4 or 
greater) and with associated p values less than .001 were excluded from analysis.  This 
left 771 cases for analysis in the current study.  
 
Construct Validity Assessment.  The CFA models for the safety culture and 
leadership performance constructs as well as the SEM itself were analyzed for goodness-
of-fit (GOF) before the hypotheses tests were conducted.  All data was analyzed using 
IBM’s SPSS AMOS software, version 23.  The 771 cases analyzed satisfied the 
minimum sample size to validate the model structure as specified by Westland (2010).  
Model GOF was assessed using the GOF statistics and criteria in Table 9.  Although there 
is some divergence in SEM literature where the appropriateness of fit statistics and 
associated criteria are concerned, there was general agreement in Byrne (2010), Kline 
(2011), and Garson (2015) about the criteria used in Table 9 and throughout this study.   
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Table 9 
CFA and SEM GOF Statistics and Criteria 
GOF Statistic Abbreviation Fit Criteria 
Χ2 to degrees-of-freedom ratio CMIN/df < 3 = good fit 
Goodness-of-fit index GFI > .9 = adequate fit    > .95 = good fit 
Adjusted goodness-of-fit index AGFI > .9 = adequate fit    > .95 = good fit 
Root mean square error of 
approximation statistic RMSEA < .05 = good fit 
Comparative fit index CFI > .9 = adequate fit    > .95 = good fit 
Normed fit index NFI > .9 = adequate fit    > .95 = good fit 
 
 
 
Post hoc analyses using modification indices calculated by the AMOS software 
were required to adapt the CFA models and the SEM to better fit the data.  Byrne (2010) 
discussed the use of modification indices associated with covariances to re-specify the 
model when the addition of covariances make sense within the context of the model.  
Garson (2015) recommended limiting the addition of covariances to intra-factor 
variables.  In the post hoc analyzes conducted on the CFAs and the SEM, modification 
indices selected to re-specify the models were limited to those associated with intra-factor 
covariances only.   
Convergent validity and discriminant validity were assessed for the CFAs.  
Convergent validity was assessed using the factor loadings on construct elements and the 
average variance extracted (AVE) per Hair et al. (2010) and through scale reliability per 
Garson (2010) and Hair et al. (2010).  Discriminant validity was assessed through change 
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in model fit per Byrne (2010) and comparison of AVE versus average squared correlation 
values per Hair et al. (2010). 
 
Hypothesis Testing.  Once model fit, convergent validity, and divergent validity 
were assessed, the hypotheses were tested using the SEM and evaluating the regression 
weights for the applicable paths.  If the standardized regression weight was positive and 
significant at p = .05 or less, the null hypothesis was rejected.  The hypotheses are listed 
below, and their applicability to the SEM is illustrated in Figure 2. 
H10 – There is no significant relationship between IS-BAO progression and safety 
culture perceptions. 
H1A – The relationship between IS-BAO progression and safety culture 
perceptions is positive and significant. 
H20 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the 
structural frame and safety culture perceptions. 
H2A – The relationship between leadership performance in the structural frame 
and safety culture perceptions is positive and significant. 
H30 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the 
human resources frame and safety culture perceptions. 
H3A – The relationship between leadership performance in the human resources 
frame and safety culture perceptions is positive and significant. 
H40 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the 
political frame and safety culture perceptions. 
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H4A – The relationship between leadership performance in the political frame and 
safety culture perceptions is positive and significant. 
H50 – There is no significant relationship between leadership performance in the 
symbolic frame and safety culture perceptions. 
H5A – The relationship between leadership performance in the symbolic frame and 
safety culture perceptions is positive and significant.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Simplified SEM with Hypotheses Annotated.  Notation has been adapted to 
reflect variable flow.  The notation is not consistent with that used in AMOS SEM 
modeling diagrams.  The full SEM appears in Appendix F.  
 
 
 
Ethics and IRB Considerations.  An IRB application for human subjects testing 
was submitted and approval received prior to data collection for this study (See Appendix 
E).  The electronic submission and collection mechanism (www.surveymonkey.com) did 
provide some identifying data for respondents, but that data was discarded.  The 
researcher did agree to provide the aviation managers of the organizations that 
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participated summary data of their organization’s average scores versus the overall 
averages.  Respondents were advised that organizational averages and overall averages 
would be provided to their aviation manager. 
 
Summary 
 While the technical description of methodology used in the current study is 
important, the purpose and intentions behind the methodology should not be overlooked 
as part of that discussion.  The quantity of data received, the quality of data generated, 
and the thoroughness of the analysis performed all contributed to the overall objective of 
the study: the examination and comparison of the effects of IS-BAO progression and 
leadership performance on safety culture perceptions.  
While the sampling mechanism did not operate as envisioned or provide as large a 
representation of the U.S. IS-BAO-registered operator population as expected, the results 
received probably reflected the population sufficiently and were definitely adequate to 
validate the structures of the CFAs and SEM.  Hence, the quantity of data generated was 
likely sufficient to measure the effects of IS-BAO progression and leadership 
performance on safety culture perceptions.    
The safety culture and leadership performance assessment instruments used to 
generate the data received were pretested and validated in previous studies before their 
use in the current study.  The methodology described was built, in part, to test and 
validate the safety culture and leadership performance constructs again in the current 
study.  The previous and current tests ensure the quality of data generated was sufficient 
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to measure the effects of IS-BAO progression and leadership performance on safety 
culture perceptions.   
With sufficient quantity and quality of data, the methodology discussed allows for 
tests of the hypotheses that actually measure the effects of IS-BAO progression and 
leadership performance on safety culture perceptions.  The results of that methodology 
are presented in the next section.         
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Data Preparation 
As previously discussed, of the 980 responses or cases received, 134 were deleted 
because the respondent did not consent and opted out of the survey, or the respondent 
completed only the safety culture perceptions portion of the survey and did not complete 
the leadership performance portion.  The remaining 846 cases were analyzed for 
multivariate outliers and 75 cases with D2 values 4 or greater with associated p values 
less than .001 were discarded for analysis in the final SEM model, leaving a total of 771 
respondent cases for examination.   
 
Participants 
 The 771 respondents that generated the cases for examination were employees of 
156 U.S. IS-BAO-registered operators.  Of these 156 operators, 51 had only one 
respondent, the person who received the survey link, and 105 had multiple respondents 
because the link was forwarded throughout the department.  The majority of the 
responding operators, 127 of 156 or 81.4%, were corporate flight departments operating 
under 14 C.F.R. Part 91.  The remaining 29 operators (18.6%) operated under 14 C.F.R. 
parts 135, 141, and 125.  The proportion of the IS-BAO Stages of the respondent 
organizations appears at Figure 3.  The years that the operators were IS-BAO-registered 
ranged from a low of less than one year to a maximum of 14 years, and the distribution 
appears at Figure 4.  The distribution of employee levels among the individual 
respondents appears at Figure 5.   
65 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Operator proportion vs IS-BAO registration stage   
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Operator distribution over years IS-BAO registered   
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Figure 5. Individual respondent employee level.  Line employees were defined as flight 
crew members, technicians, or schedulers; middle managers were defined as standards 
captains or lead technicians; and senior management was defined as chief pilots, directors 
of maintenance, and directors of aviation.   
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the IS-BAO and safety culture perceptions variables 
appear in Table 11.  Descriptive statistics for the leadership performance variables appear 
in Table 12.  IS-BAO Stage was limited to the values of 1, 2, or 3.  Years IS-BAO-
registered could assume any integer value of 1 or above.  The remaining values were 
derived from a Likert Scale that generated a score value from 1 to 5.  Questions that were 
negatively phrased were reverse-coded so greater positive values were generated for 
more negative responses.  The mean values of the SC and LP variables represent the 
average participant response to the questions presented in Appendix A. 
One of the most important criteria for both CFA and SEM using the maximum 
likelihood method of estimation is for the data to be multivariate normal, particularly 
where the multivariate kurtosis of the sample is concerned (Byrne, 2010).  
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The univariate kurtosis for each variable in Tables 11 and 12 is less than 7, the 
maximum recommended value (Byrne, 2010).  Multivariate kurtosis was a bit more 
complicated to assess because it had to be measured in three different constructs.  While 
Byrne (2010) stated that a critical ratio of multivariate kurtosis greater than 5 means that 
there is multivariate non-normality present in the data, Hair et al. (2010) argued that the 
effects of multivariate non-normality can by mitigated by larger sample sizes.  The 
generally accepted ratio to minimize those effects is 15 respondents for each variable 
tested (Hair et al., 2010).  The critical ratios of multivariate kurtosis for the first order 
CFAs for SCP and LP as well as for the SEM are presented in Table 10.  While all the 
ratios are above 5, the maximum value recommended by Byrne (2010), the number of 
cases/respondents analyzed, 771, is greater than the minimum ratio required to mitigate 
the effects of multivariate non-normality for both the SCP and LP CFAs, but not greater 
than that required for the SEM.  Hence, some multivariate non-normality may exist in the 
data and may generate some bias in the results.   
 
Table 10 
Multivariate Kurtosis Summary for Study Constructs 
Construct Critical Ratio of Multivariate Kurtosis  
Number of 
Variables 
Minimum Cases to Overcome 
Multivariate Non-Normality 
SCP CFA 68.95 23 345 
LP CFA 75.05 32 480 
SEM 74.26 57 855 
Note. 771 cases analyzed.  Minimum cases computed per Hair et al. (2010), 15 cases or 
respondents for each variable analyzed. 
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Table 11 
Descriptive Statistics for IS-BAO and Safety Culture Perceptions Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. N=771 for all variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Mode Skewness Skewness 
Critical 
Ratio 
Kurtosis Kurtosis 
Critical 
Ratio 
IS_Stage 2.423 0.719 3 -0.829 -9.403 -0.638 -3.616 
IS_Years 6.497 3.252 6 0.33 3.741 -0.479 -2.714 
SCP_1 4.23 .716 4 -.922 -10.447 1.734 9.826 
SCP_2 4.45 .727 5 -1.645 -18.644 3.873 21.949 
SCP_3 4.13 .941 4 -1.271 -14.407 1.447 8.201 
SCP_4 4.20 .745 4 -.944 -10.698 1.436 8.141 
SCP_5 3.73 .971 4 -.818 -9.275 .207 1.173 
SCP_6 3.86 1.005 4 -.817 -9.258 .209 1.186 
SCP_7 4.15 .801 4 -.967 -10.960 1.237 7.009 
SCP_8 4.17 .851 4 -1.095 -12.410 1.276 7.234 
SCP_9 4.29 .875 5 -1.360 -15.418 1.809 10.254 
SCP_10 4.15 .755 4 -.800 -9.068 .765 4.338 
SCP_11 4.34 .826 5 -1.456 -16.509 2.350 13.318 
SCP_12 3.68 .931 4 -.525 -5.950 -.241 -1.368 
SCP_13 4.09 .866 4 -.974 -11.041 .815 4.617 
SCP_14 4.01 .819 4 -.825 -9.348 .784 4.446 
SCP_15 4.23 .829 4 -1.207 -13.678 1.525 8.644 
SCP_16 4.30 .743 4 -1.273 -14.435 2.632 14.919 
SCP_17 4.00 .762 4 -.813 -9.217 1.138 6.451 
SCP_18 4.20 .887 4 -1.423 -16.126 2.375 13.459 
SCP_19 3.76 1.115 4 -.734 -8.316 -.319 -1.81 
SCP_20 3.99 .968 4 -1.097 -12.438 .977 5.535 
SCP_21 4.08 .862 4 -1.035 -11.730 1.132 6.417 
SCP_22 4.15 .854 4 -.946 -10.729 .721 4.085 
SCP_23 3.85 .813 4 -.671 -7.606 .784 4.443 
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Table 12 
Descriptive Statistics for Leadership Performance Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. N=771 for all variables. 
 
Variable Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Mode Skewness Skewness 
Critical 
Ratio 
Kurtosis Kurtosis 
Critical 
Ratio 
SF_1 4.06 .895 4 -.931 -10.554 .641 3.634 
SF_2 4.03 .888 4 -.979 -11.098 1.022 5.795 
SF_3 4.13 .915 4 -1.071 -12.141 .888 5.03 
SF_4 3.98 .903 4 -.933 -10.579 .815 4.618 
SF_5 4.16 .889 4 -1.101 -12.476 1.025 5.808 
SF_6 3.95 .952 4 -.800 -9.069 .233 1.32 
SF_7 4.06 .965 5 -.893 -10.124 .176 0.997 
SF_8 4.12 .915 4 -1.115 -12.634 1.102 6.244 
HRF_1 4.10 .969 5 -.970 -10.995 .325 1.842 
HRF_2 3.93 1.059 4 -.970 -10.996 .282 1.599 
HRF_3 3.93 1.022 4 -.783 -8.872 -.070 -0.399 
HRF_4 3.88 1.029 4 -.818 -9.278 .083 0.473 
HRF_5 4.07 .914 4 -.967 -10.967 .686 3.89 
HRF_6 3.91 1.030 4 -.825 -9.355 .012 0.071 
HRF_7 4.03 .974 4 -.878 -9.958 .154 0.871 
HRF_8 4.05 1.001 5 -.970 -10.991 .264 1.497 
PF_1 4.01 .922 4 -.867 -9.832 .403 2.283 
PF_2 3.66 1.007 4 -.526 -5.965 -.259 -1.467 
PF_3 3.53 1.047 4 -.458 -5.193 -.324 -1.834 
PF_4 3.70 .960 4 -.643 -7.285 .214 1.211 
PF_5 3.85 .958 4 -.752 -8.522 .221 1.253 
PF_6 3.80 .985 4 -.791 -8.966 .318 1.8 
PF_7 3.86 1.011 4 -.807 -9.154 .252 1.428 
PF_8 3.88 .873 4 -.868 -9.838 .865 4.904 
SYF_1 4.00 1.036 5 -.989 -11.206 .382 2.166 
SYF_2 3.55 1.080 4 -.463 -5.253 -.455 -2.578 
SYF_3 3.66 1.061 4 -.646 -7.325 -.195 -1.108 
SYF_4 3.69 1.010 4 -.556 -6.299 -.195 -1.104 
SYF_5 3.99 .968 4 -.902 -10.223 .362 2.054 
SYF_6 3.71 1.026 4 -.634 -7.185 -.038 -0.215 
SYF_7 3.85 1.050 4 -.855 -9.692 .057 0.322 
SYF_8 3.95 1.030 4 -.957 -10.848 .437 2.475 
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Reliability Testing 
 Table 13 presents the scale reliability for all of the constructs and scales used in 
the study.  While unstandardized and standardized values of Cronbach’s α were 
calculated for all scales, the standardized values are most applicable for the two data 
items used to calculate IS-BAO progression since the data items have different 
measurement scales.  The standardized values for all scales are well above the accepted 
minimum of .7 (Field, 2013), hence the scale reliability for all constructs used in the 
study may be considered adequate. 
 
Table 13 
Study Construct Scale Reliability 
Measurement Area Variables α − unstandardized α − standardized 
IS-BAO Progression 2 .477 .852 
The Informed Culture 5 .775 .789 
The Empowered Culture 4 .758 .760 
The Reporting Culture 5 .813 .813 
The Learning Culture 4 .805 .809 
The Just Culture Scale 5 .864 .868 
Safety Culture Perceptions 23 .948 .949 
The Structural Frame 8 .939 .940 
The Human Resources Frame 8 .956 .956 
The Political Frame 8 .920 .921 
The Symbolic Frame 8 .955 .955 
Leadership Performance 32 .982 .983 
All Assessed Variables 55 .982 .982 
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Validity Testing 
 Construct validity was evaluated by assessing convergent and discriminant 
validity for the first order CFA on the leadership performance construct and the first 
order CFA on the safety culture perceptions construct.  A second order CFA linking the 
leadership performance and safety culture perceptions constructs was necessary to further 
test for discriminant validity.  GOF statistics were evaluated for all models.   
 
Leadership Performance Construct CFA.  To demonstrate the construct 
validity of Bolman and Deal’s Leadership Frames assessment instrument and its 
associated measurement of leadership performance, a first order CFA was performed on 
the construct.  One post hoc analysis was performed using modification indices 
associated with intra-factor error terms.   
The final GOF values generated by the AMOS software confirmed acceptable to 
good model fit in all but one indicator, adjusted goodness-of-fit (AGFI).  Table 14 shows 
the pre and post hoc GOF statistics for the Leadership Performance CFA.  The final CFA 
model appears at Appendix I.  
The leadership performance construct validity assessment statistics appear in 
Table 15.  The construct displayed strong convergent validity.  Scale reliability for all 
constructs was greater than .7 (Hair et al., 2010).  All standardized factor loadings and all 
AVE values were greater than .5 (Hair et al., 2010).  Discriminant validity was more 
difficult to assess.  The model fit improved with the post hoc analysis and demonstrated 
positive changes in GOF criteria (Byrne, 2010) (Table 14), demonstrating some evidence 
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of discriminant validity.  But the squared correlation values for factor loadings were 
greater than the AVE values, not less (Hair et al., 2010), demonstrating evidence of a lack 
of discriminant validity.  Given these conflicting results, the model did not seem to 
provide enough evidence to evaluate discriminant validity. 
 
 
 
Table 14 
Leadership Performance Construct CFA GOF Statistics 
 
 
 
Table 15 
Leadership Performance Construct CFA Validity Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Subconstruct descriptions appear in Table 5. 
GOF Statistic Criteria First Run Value Final Run Value 
CMIN/df    <  3 3.532 2.669 
GFI >/= .9 - .95 .867 .908 
AGFI >/= .9 - .95 .846 .888 
RMSEA    < .05 .057 .047 
CFI >/= .9 - .95 .954 .971 
NFI >/= .9 - .95 .937 .955 
Subconstruct 
Scale 
Reliability 
α AVE 
Subconstruct 
Correlation 
Squared 
Correlation 
Value 
LP_SF .940 .644 LP_SF vs LP_SYF .893 
LP_HRF .956 .722 LP_PF vs LP_SYF .943 
LP_PF .921 .567 LP_HRF vs LP_SYF .974 
LP_SYF .955 .725 LP_HRF vs LP_PF .876 
   LP_SF vs LP_PF .929 
   LP_SF vs LP_HRF .887 
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Safety Culture Perceptions Construct CFA.  To demonstrate the construct 
validity of the safety culture perceptions assessment instrument, a first order CFA was 
performed on the construct.  Two post hoc analyses were performed using modification 
indices associated with intra-factor error terms. 
The final GOF values generated by the AMOS software for the safety culture 
perceptions construct confirmed acceptable to good model fit.  Table 16 shows the pre 
and post hoc GOF statistics for the safety culture perceptions CFA.  The final CFA model 
appears at Appendix J.  
 
 
 
Table 16 
Safety Culture Perceptions Construct CFA GOF Statistics 
 
 
 
Safety culture perceptions construct validity statistics appear in Table 17.  The 
construct displayed adequate convergent validity.  Scale reliability for all constructs was 
greater than .7 (Hair et al., 2010).  Nearly all standardized factor loadings were greater 
than .5, but only two of five AVE values were greater than .5 (Hair et al., 2010).  Similar 
GOF Statistic Criteria First Run Value Final Run Value 
CMIN/df    <  3 3.786 2.853 
GFI >/= .9 .908 .933 
AGFI >/= .9 .884 .912 
RMSEA    < .05 .06 .049 
CFI >/= .95 .935 .959 
NFI >/= .9 .914 .938 
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to the leadership performance construct, discriminant validity was challenging to assess 
for the safety culture perceptions construct.  The model fit improved with the post hoc 
analysis and demonstrated a positive change in GOF criteria (Table 15), demonstrating 
some evidence of discriminant validity (Byrne, 2010) but the squared correlation values 
for factor loadings were greater than the AVE values, not less, demonstrating evidence of 
a lack of discriminant validity.  Thus the safety perceptions construct did not provide 
sufficient evidence to evaluate discriminant validity.  
 
 
 
Table 17 
Safety Culture Perceptions Construct CFA Validity Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Subconstruct names abbreviated for space.  IC = Informed Culture, EC = 
Empowered Culture, RC = Reporting Culture, LC = Learning Culture, JC = Just Culture 
 
 
Subconstruct 
Scale 
Reliability 
α AVE 
Subconstruct 
Correlation 
Squared 
Correlation 
Value 
IC .789 .416 IC vs JC .778 
EC .760 .384 IC vs LC .916 
RC .813 .441 IC vs RC .863 
LC .809 .521 IC vs EC .922 
JC .868 .558 EC vs JC 1.01 
   EC vs LC 1.01 
   EC vs RC 1.04 
   RC vs JC .947 
   RC vs LC 1.03 
   LC vs JC .815 
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Second Order Leadership Performance and Safety Culture Perceptions 
CFA.  Due to the lack of evidence to evaluate discriminant validity in the leadership 
performance and safety culture perceptions constructs and because the design of the SEM 
has the safety culture perceptions factors loading onto a second order construct, a second 
order CFA, combining the leadership performance and safety culture perceptions 
constructs, was devised in order to determine if the two second order constructs were 
truly discrete.  The second order model linked the final versions of the leadership 
performance CFA and the safety culture perceptions CFA, and no post hoc analyses were 
performed.   
In this model, the AVE values for the standardized factor loadings onto the 
second order constructs were .966 and .956 for the safety culture perceptions and 
leadership performance constructs, respectively.  The squared correlation between the 
two was .600, which is less than both AVE values.  The second order construct 
demonstrates both convergent and discriminant validity.    
The model appears at appendix K and the GOF statistics appear at Table 18.  The 
combined model demonstrated adequate to good fit in all statistics except goodness-of-fit 
index (GFI) and AGFI, which demonstrated mediocre but acceptable fit. 
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Table 18 
Second Order Leadership Performance and Safety Culture Perceptions CFA GOF 
Statistics 
 
 
 
Hypothesized SEM.  With construct validity demonstrated for the leadership 
performance and safety culture perceptions constructs, the next step in the analysis was to 
assess the GOF for the hypothesized SEM which combined the two constructs (Appendix 
F).  The initial analysis in the AMOS software showed adequate to good fit in all but two 
GOF indices, GFI and AGFI.  Post hoc analyses were performed which used 
modification indices associated with intra-factor covariances only.  The final version 
appears at Appendix L.  With all intra-factor modification indices applied, GOF values 
improved, but GFI and AGFI remained below the conventionally-accepted thresholds 
(Table 19).   
 
 
 
 
GOF Statistic Criteria Value 
CMIN/df    <  3 2.137 
GFI >/= .9 - .95 .863 
AGFI >/= .9 - .95 .848 
RMSEA    < .05 .038 
CFI >/= .9 - .95 .956 
NFI >/= .9 - .95 .92 
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Table 19 
Hypothesized SEM GOF Statistics 
 
 
 
Byrne (2010) argues that GFI and AGFI are very sensitive to sample size.  Kline 
(2011) states that mean values of GFI can actually increase as sample size increases and 
GFI values can fall outside of the 0 - 1.0 range, making them meaningless.  Sharma et al. 
(2005) conducted an extensive study of model fit indices and concluded GFI was an 
unreliable index and should not be used.  Garson (2015) argues that GFI and AGFI are 
biased downward when degrees of freedom are large relative to sample size.  Table 18 
compares the GFI and AGFI values for the leadership performance construct CFA, the 
safety culture perceptions construct CFA, and the SEM along with the associated degrees 
of freedom for each model and shows that it is possible that both indices were biased 
downward in the GOF statistic calculations for the SEM.  Garson (2015) said that given 
their susceptibility to sample size and degrees of freedom limitations, many researchers 
no longer report GFI and AGFI when assessing model GOF.  In the current model with 
771 respondents and 1,464 degrees of freedom, given that the values of CMIN/df, 
RMSEA, CFI, and NFI are at or above the conventionally accepted thresholds for model 
GOF Statistic Criteria First Run Value Final Run Value 
CMIN/df    <  3 2.450 1.901 
GFI >/= .9 - .95 .834 .878 
AGFI >/= .9 - .95 .819 .862 
RMSEA    < .05 .043 .034 
CFI >/= .9 - .95 .939 .964 
NFI >/= .9 - .95 .902 .927 
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fit and given the limitations on GFI and AGFI when degrees of freedom are large relative 
to sample size, it is concluded that the GOF measures demonstrate adequate fit for the 
SEM and the data analyzed.   
 
 
 
Table 20 
Comparison of Model GFI and AGFI Values and Degrees of Freedom 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
The simplified SEM model in Figure 6 shows the standardized regression weights 
associated with each of the paths tested by the hypotheses in this study.  Regression 
weights with asterisks are significant at p < .05 or better.  Hypothesis test results are 
summarized in Table 21. 
 
 
Model Degrees of Freedom GFI Value AGFI Value 
Safety Culture Perceptions CFA 211 .933 .912 
Leadership Performance CFA 432 .908 .888 
SEM 1464 .878 .862 
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Figure 6. Simplified SEM model with hypotheses and standardized regression weights.  
Notation has been adapted to reflect variable flow.  The notation is not consistent with 
that used in AMOS SEM modeling diagrams.  Actual hypothesized SEM model appears 
at Appendix F.  
 
 
 
Given the data analyzed and the model presented, IS-BAO progression, leadership 
performance in the political frame, and leadership performance in the symbolic frame did 
not positively and significantly affect safety culture perceptions in the IS-BAO-registered 
organizations that were examined.  In contrast, leadership performance in the structural 
frame and leadership performance in the human resources frame did positively and 
significantly affect safety culture perceptions in those organizations.  The impact of these 
results will be discussed in the next section. 
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Table 21 
Hypothesis Test Results 
Note: SCP = safety culture perceptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis (Relationship between 
two items positive and significant) 
Standardized 
Regression Weight p value 
Hypothesis 
Supported? 
1 - IS-BAO Progression & SCP -.026 .933 No 
2 - Leadership Performance in the 
Structural Frame & SCP 
.507 .013 Yes 
3 - Leadership Performance in the 
Human Resources Frame & SCP 
.505 .002 Yes 
4 - Leadership Performance in the 
Political Frame & SCP 
.268 .405 No 
5 - Leadership Performance in the 
Symbolic Frame & SCP 
-.483 .095 No 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research was the first scientific study conducted into the effects of both IS-
BAO progression and leadership performance on safety culture perceptions in the field of 
business aviation.  It was also the first study to examine and compare the effects of SMS 
implementation, through IS-BAO, with the effects of leadership on the safety culture of 
private corporate operators operating under 14 C.F.R. Part 91, a group that constituted a 
large majority of the IS-BAO-registered operators who participated.  The overall results 
were somewhat mixed.  In some respects, the results of this study seemed to echo the 
conclusions of much of the literature surveyed, in that the leadership of aviation 
organizations had a significant impact on the safety culture of those organizations.  But 
the study results also seemed to contrast much of the literature in that SMS 
implementation, through IS-BAO and over time, seemed to have no impact on safety 
culture whatsoever.   
In the paragraphs to follow, the overall reliability and validity of the model will 
be discussed, the results of each hypothesis test will be examined in detail, and possible 
conclusions from those results will be discussed.  Some overall conclusions will be 
discussed as well.  Finally, recommendations for further research will be presented.   
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Reliability Analysis.  The results of the reliability analysis (Table 13) were 
largely unsurprising although the two-item scale for IS-BAO Progression proved more 
reliable than anticipated given the standardized α value of .852.  The scale reliability 
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values for the safety culture perceptions constructs were better than those generated by 
the pre-tests, and the values for the leadership performance constructs were better than 
the historical averages provided by Bolman (2010).  The overall scale reliability for all 
safety culture perceptions values, all leadership performance values, and all values 
combined were well above the required minimum.  The overall instrument and its 
associated sub-constructs were considered reliable and generated similar results among 
the respondents participating in the study. 
 
Validity Analysis.  The leadership performance and safety culture perceptions 
CFAs both demonstrated convergent validity.  With the addition of the second order CFA 
which linked both constructs, discriminant validity was demonstrated as well.  The 
leadership performance CFA, safety culture perceptions CFA, and SEM demonstrated 
adequate model fit, given the limitations on GFI and AGFI as discussed earlier.  In short, 
the hypothesized model demonstrated adequate construct validity and was suitable to test 
the hypotheses that were the basis of this research. 
 
Hypothesis Tests and Conclusions.  The purpose of this study was to examine 
and compare the effects of IS-BAO progression and leadership performance on the 
perceptions of safety culture in IS-BAO-registered business aviation organizations.  The 
results from the hypothesis tests showed mixed results in the examination of those 
effects. 
H1.  H1A hypothesized that the relationship between IS-BAO progression and 
safety culture perceptions would be positive and significant; specifically, that as an 
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organization matures through the three stages of registration and spends more time under 
IS-BAO, more time under a safety management system, the health of the organization’s 
safety culture, as measured by the perceptions of those in it, will improve.  Given 
previous studies, particularly McNeely (2012), this improvement in safety culture 
perceptions seemed to be a logical conclusion.  According to the SEM model and the 
data, this relationship was not significant; i.e. statistically, no relationship exists.  This 
result is somewhat surprising for while the literature was somewhat divided on whether 
safety culture was a precondition for or a product of SMS implementation, none of the 
literature indicated that SMS implementation, in and of itself, had no impact on the safety 
culture at all.  Yet previous studies did not attempt to measure the impact of IS-BAO / 
SMS progression on safety culture simultaneously with the impact of leadership 
performance on safety culture, so while the effect of IS-BAO / SMS progression on 
safety culture is not significant in this study, it may be that the effect of IS-BAO / SMS 
progression on safety culture is simply overshadowed by the effect of leadership 
performance on safety culture when the two are measured alongside one another.  
Another possible conclusion may be that the success of the SMS where safety culture is 
concerned is more about the leadership that implements the SMS than that success is 
about the SMS itself. 
H2.  H2A hypothesized that the relationship between safety culture perceptions and 
leadership performance in the structural frame would be positive and significant, and this 
hypothesis was supported in the context of the SEM and the data analyzed.  According to 
Bolman and Deal (2013), the structural frame of leadership is about the structure of the 
organization and the environment in which the organization operates.  The structural 
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frame also encompasses roles, goals, policies, and the use of technology (Bolman & 
Deal, 2013).  The structural construct corresponds well to the safety policies and 
objectives element in the FAA’s (2010) framework for SMS, one of the pillars of an 
effective SMS as the FAA describes it.  The results from this hypothesis would seem to 
echo the literature reviewed in that for a safety culture to be healthy, leadership must 
establish and maintain a sound structure in which the culture may exist and in which the 
SMS may operate.  The strength of the standardized regression weight for this particular 
leadership frame, .507, is impressive.  For each one-unit improvement in leadership in the 
structural frame, safety culture perceptions increase over .5 units.  This conclusion speaks 
to the importance of leadership that clearly defines the policies and procedures that 
surround not only the SMS but the entire organization. 
H3.  H3A hypothesized that the relationship between safety culture perceptions and 
leadership performance in the human resources frame would be positive and significant, 
and this hypothesis was supported in the context of the SEM and the data analyzed.  The 
essence of leadership performance in the human resources frame is the leader taking care 
of his or her people like a family and empowering them to perform (Bolman & Deal, 
2013).  Zohar (2010) maintained that a leader’s concern for his or her people’s welfare 
made the leader more effective and strengthened the safety climate of the organization.  
Here again it would seem that study results align with the literature, and leadership 
performance in the human resources frame – a leader caring about his people – directly 
affects the safety culture of the organization.  The regression weight of this frame on 
safety culture was nearly as high as that of the structural frame on safety culture, a .5-unit 
increase in safety culture perceptions for every one-unit change in leadership 
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performance in the human resources frame with a higher level of statistical significance 
than that of the structural frame.  Lipman (2012) echoed a quote that is the essence of 
leadership as it is taught in the military: “take care of your people and they’ll take care of 
you” (para 1).  Where the effect of taking care of one’s people in an aviation environment 
is concerned, the results of this hypothesis test seem to confirm that strong leadership in 
the human resources frame does indeed affect the manner in which employees perceive 
the safety culture and in so doing affects the way in which they contribute to the health of 
the organization, per Wiegmann et al.’s (2002) definition of safety culture.  
H4.  H4A hypothesized that the relationship between safety culture perceptions and 
leadership performance in the political frame would be positive and significant.  
Statistically, the relationship was not significant although the regression weight was 
positive.  Bolman & Deal (2013) maintained that leadership in the political frame is about 
competition, power, and agendas.  Schein (2010) argued that one of the ways leaders 
embed culture in their organizations is through the allocation of both resources and 
power.  Kotter (1996) spoke to the importance of leaders managing the politics within 
their organizations to facilitate cultural change.  While discussions on the importance of 
the political element of leadership are somewhat common in literature that deals with 
leadership alone, those same discussions are more difficult to find in literature that 
focuses on safety culture.  Stolzer et al. (2008) alluded to the political element of 
leadership when they described the importance of the political role of the SMS champion 
within an organization as the role of that position is politically enabled by the CEO or 
accountable executive.  Perhaps the most direct discussion of the influence of political 
leadership on safety culture came from Antonsen (2009) who discussed the role of power, 
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specifically political power, in organizational safety culture.  He went as far as to argue 
that issues of culture and power are so intertwined that safety culture research should 
incorporate perspectives of power and conflict (Antonsen, 2009).  Here, Antonsen’s 
(2009) findings echo those of Schein (2010), and it would therefore seem illogical to 
argue that politics and power do not play an important role in the creation and 
maintenance of safety culture.    
 The results of the current study, however, stand in contrast to Antonsen’s (2009) 
conclusion and indicate that political aspect of leadership is not significant.  Yet in the 
context of the SEM model, the political frame of leadership was not assessed singly but 
alongside the structural, human resources and symbolic frames, both of which 
demonstrated significance.  A more correct interpretation of the results is not that the 
political aspect of leadership is not significant, but instead that alongside of the influence 
of structural and human resources interactions, a leader’s influence in the political frame 
does not have the same level of significance.  Given the literature’s emphasis on the 
structural elements of leadership and the human resources elements but few discussions 
on the political elements, this conclusion echoes the findings of others.  
H5.  H5A hypothesized that the relationship between safety culture perceptions and 
leadership performance in the symbolic frame would be positive and significant.  Here, 
the results were somewhat surprising.  For while the relationship was not significant, the 
regression weight was negative.  Bolman and Deal (2013) argued that the symbolic frame 
is where cultural elements of an organization reside, but their depiction of these elements, 
per the label of the frame, are limited to rituals, symbols, images, and the inspiration that 
these elements create in subordinates.  The questions in their instrument dealing with the 
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symbolic frame reflect their conclusions.  While Schein (2010) also discusses the 
importance of rituals, symbols, and images, he maintains that culture is really about the 
way things are done in an organization.  Torres (2011) maintains that the credibility of 
the commander directly affects the command climate or safety culture of an organization, 
so it would appear that the symbols, or perhaps more pointedly, the trappings of 
leadership and culture can perhaps have a negative effect on safety culture perceptions.  
And, as the literature previously reviewed emphasizes, from a safety culture perspective, 
leaders must lead by example through the actions they take, not the words they speak or 
even the symbols they may create.   
Once again though, it may be that in the context of the SEM and the data 
analyzed, that alongside the effects of both leadership in the structural frame and 
leadership in the human resources frame, the effects of leadership in the symbolic frame, 
like the effects of leadership in the political frame, are pushed into insignificance.  It is 
also possible that the questions that assessed leadership in the symbolic frame may need 
to be reexamined and perhaps modified to better assess the symbolic elements of both 
organizational and safety culture.  
 
Overall Conclusions.  The results of this study clearly indicate that a program, 
even one as well designed and intentioned as IS-BAO, cannot create or maintain a safety 
culture in an organization without the facilitation and direction of the organization’s 
leadership, particularly as leadership is exercised in the structural and human resources 
frames.   
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Leaders must direct the creation of policies and guidance at the organizational 
level to facilitate the implementation and sustainment of the safety culture that allows IS-
BAO’s SMS to be effective.  Leaders must also take care of their people and allow the 
organization to serve its people as the people serve the organization, or more pointedly, 
allow the SMS to serve the people who work inside of it as the people work inside the 
SMS.  Leaders must be collaborative in the manner in which SMS processes are executed 
and provide the people who work inside the safety culture the freedom to make inputs to 
improve the culture.  Kotter (1996) argues that while leaders can start the process for 
cultural change in an organization, the change is not complete until those inside the 
organization embrace and internalize the change.  The importance and interaction of the 
structural and human resources frames of leadership where safety culture is concerned 
would seem to parallel Kotter’s construct.  Leaders must not only provide the structure to 
facilitate safety culture, but they must also provide an environment where their people 
can freely act inside the culture through the SMS.  In so doing, leaders allow for closure 
of the loop between their intentions for the safety culture and actions of their 
subordinates, the combination of which make the culture real for the organization and 
embed that culture into the organization. 
Where the political and symbolic frames of leadership are concerned, the results 
are inconclusive.  While both elements, particularly the political one, are important in the 
manifestation of leadership and the impact of that leadership on safety culture, it would 
seem that the effects of leadership in the structural and human resources frame 
overshadow the effects of leadership in the political and symbolic frames.  
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Recommendations  
This study examined leadership as a construct apart from safety culture and 
produced an instrument that demonstrated reliability and validity to assess the 
relationships between safety culture perceptions, IS-BAO progression and leadership 
performance.  While there are several ways in which the spectrum of knowledge on 
safety culture could benefit from further research related to this study, the results of this 
study are immediately applicable to the official literature dealing with safety management 
system implementation and safety culture.  Future investigation could further examine 
leadership’s impact on safety culture, the SEM instrument used in this study, and the 
effects of IS-BAO/SMS and the various leadership frames on safety culture. 
 
 Immediate Applicability to Official Literature.  Official regulatory 
publications on safety management system description and implementation, such as 
ICAO’s Safety Management Manual, the FAA’s AC120-92A and IBAC’s IS-BAO 
description, briefly discuss the importance of senior management involvement in the 
creation, health and maintenance of an SMS.  Yet, none of these documents provides a 
detailed description of how organizational leadership affects the safety culture from 
either a theoretical or practical perspective.  Moreover, the documents do not discuss the 
impact of specific leadership behaviors on safety culture.  For organizations that are new 
to SMS and safety culture and those organizations with an SMS that are attempting to 
improve their safety culture, discussions dealing with the importance of leadership and 
leadership behaviors could provide helpful insight into leadership’s critical role in safety 
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culture creation and maintenance and perhaps challenge leaders to act in a way that better 
supports the safety culture in their organizations.  
 
Future Studies of Safety Culture and Safety Management Systems.  As the 
literature review in this study has demonstrated, there is much agreement in scholarly 
literature on the importance of leadership’s role in the creation and maintenance of a 
healthy safety culture.  There are also several studies of both safety culture and safety 
management systems that discuss how the two interact.  While leadership has been 
studied in some safety culture measurement studies, the leadership elements measured 
were only those that were manifested through the safety culture.  The current study was 
different in that the construct it used examined leadership as a separate element, in and of 
itself, and then examined the effects of leadership performance on safety culture 
perceptions.  Future studies that focus on safety culture should also examine leadership as 
a separate element to further investigate the effects of leadership and leadership styles on 
safety culture and SMS implementation.  These studies could explore the use of other 
leadership assessment instruments that evaluate leadership’s impact on the organization 
and then compare the impact on safety culture perceptions.  If smaller populations and 
organizations were studied, perhaps more detailed leadership instruments like those of 
The Leadership Circle could be utilized which could provide more in depth analyses of 
the impact of leadership behaviors on safety culture perceptions.   
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 Further Refinement of the Instrument and Model.  Since the first order 
construct models for leadership performance and safety culture perceptions did not 
provide sufficient evidence of discriminant validity, a second order construct was devised 
that directly linked overall leadership performance as a latent variable, to safety culture 
perceptions.  After it was confirmed that correlation between overall leadership 
performance and safety culture perceptions was less than the standardized regression 
weights on the two constructs, the second-order model was not further investigated.  
Future research could focus upon a model that incorporated IS-BAO or SMS progression 
constructs into the second order construct to determine if that model fit the dataset better 
than the SEM tested in this study.  The current data or a future dataset could be evaluated 
through the second order model and the appropriate hypotheses re-tested.  
 
Further Research on the Effects of Leadership Performance in the Political 
and Symbolic Frames.  The effects of leadership performance in the political and 
symbolic leadership frames in this study did not yield results that were significant, but 
those results may have been overshadowed by the effects of leadership performance in 
the structural and human resources frames.  The literature confirms the importance of the 
political frame of leadership in general, and there is some discussion about the effects of 
politics and power on safety culture.  Perhaps a version of the SEM that isolates and 
focuses on both the political and symbolic frames of leadership might provide a better 
examination of the impact of those frames on safety culture perceptions. 
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Further Research on IS-BAO-registered Operators.  As useful and 
contributive to the body of knowledge this study may have been, the results were 
somewhat limited by the lack of participation among the population of the operators who 
were IS-BAO-registered.  Since the results of this study will be published on IBAC’s 
website and shared with the entire IS-BAO community, perhaps the dissemination of the 
results will lead to more acceptance of this type of research by IS-BAO operators and 
lessen the resistance to future data-gathering efforts.  More attempts should be made to 
gather additional data from inside the population of IS-BAO-registered operators, using 
the same instrument to increase the sample size and confirm the conclusions herein.  
Also, Sonnie Bates, the Director of IS-BAO for IBAC, has mentioned administering the 
instrument to all IS-BAO-registrants when those registrants are audited for IS-BAO 
renewal (personal communication, November 18, 2015), perhaps providing a mechanism 
to increase the sample size without the perceived intrusiveness of mass-survey 
distribution.  Another mechanism for exploration could be an IBAC-provided abbreviated 
questionnaire, based on the current instrument that would be administered to flight crew 
members and maintenance personnel by IS-BAO auditors after observation of operational 
flights or maintenance activities.    
 
Further Research on All Business Aviation Operators.  The relationship 
between safety culture perceptions and leadership does not apply only to IS-BAO 
registered operators.  With support from the NBAA, a sampling frame comprised of IS-
BAO and non-IS-BAO operators that are NBAA members could be constructed and a 
modified version of the study instrument administered to operators selected.  The 
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conclusions obtained from such a study could compare and contrast both the leadership 
performance and safety culture perceptions of IS-BAO and non-IS-BAO operators.   
 
Final Remarks 
Business aviation is not a field that has historically attracted much scientific or 
scholarly research, as demonstrated by the lack of literature surveyed that dealt with the 
industry.  This lack of scientific study has resulted in a corresponding lack of data where 
many important subject areas are concerned leaving these areas subject to discussion 
based on opinions and speculation.  While the results of this study may be unsurprising to 
some, they add empirical data in a vital topic area to an industry that needs it.  The results 
of this study confirm that safety culture in business aviation, as in commercial airline 
aviation or even non-aviation industries, is about leadership, not a program.  While there 
is much more research that can be performed, perhaps now, given these results, the 
discussion about safety culture and leadership in the business aviation industry can 
transition from the realm of opinion and speculation to the realm of data and in so doing, 
perhaps contribute to raising the level of safety in the industry even higher.  
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APPENDIX B 
First Pre-test Safety Culture Measurement Instrument with Citations 
 
All questions, with the exception of respondent data, will be answered using a Likert 1-7 
scale: strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, neither agree nor disagree, slightly 
agree, agree, strongly agree 
 
Respondent Data 
What Stage of IS-BAO Registration has your organization attained?          
How many years has your organization been IS-BAO registered?                                  
How many aircraft does your organization operate?                                                        
How many people are in your organization?                                                                     
What level position do you hold in your organization?                            
 
 
Measurement Area 1 – The Informed Culture. People are knowledgeable about the 
human, technical, organizational and environmental factors that determine the safety of 
the system as a whole (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). 
 
1. My organization places high priority on training. 
2. Our procedures require all pilots to attend aircraft training twice yearly. 
3. My leadership is more concerned with the budget than training. 
4. We are required to complete all IS-BAO ancillary training items every 24 months. 
5. Leadership makes me aware of all organizational factors that can affect the way I do 
my job. 
Measurement Area 2 – The Flexible Culture.  People can adapt organizational 
processes when facing high temporary operations or certain kinds of danger, shifting 
from the conventional hierarchical mode to a flatter mode (Stolzer et al., 2008). 
 
6. My operations manual allows for deviation from established procedures. 
 
7. Line personnel are seldom asked for input when my organization’s procedures are 
developed or changed (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006). 
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8. Line personnel are actively involved in identifying and resolving my organization’s 
safety or operational concerns (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 
2006).  
9. Line personnel have little real authority to make decisions that affect the safety of 
normal flight operations (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006). 
10. If I deviate from my organization’s operational procedures, I can expect disciplinary 
action. 
 
Measurement Area 3 – The Reporting Culture.  People are prepared to report their 
errors and experiences (Stolzer et al., 2008).  
 
11. The safety reporting system is convenient and easy to use (Question adapted from 
Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).  
12. All personnel can report safety discrepancies without fear of negative repercussions 
(Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).  
13. All personnel are willing to report information regarding marginal performance or 
unsafe actions of other employees (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 
2006). 
14. Personnel don’t bother reporting near misses or close calls since these events don’t 
cause any real damage (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006.) 
15. Personnel are willing to file reports about unsafe situations, even if the situation was 
caused by their own actions (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006.)   
Measurement Area 4 – The Learning Culture. People have the willingness and the 
competence to draw conclusions from safety information systems and the will to 
implement major reforms (Stolzer et al., 2008). 
 
16. If I raise a safety issue it will be communicated to everyone else in my organization 
(Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006). 
114 
 
 
17. If I report a safety problem, it will be corrected in a timely manner (Question adapted 
from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).  
18. My organization’s personnel are satisfied with the way the organization deals with 
safety reports (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).  
19. My organization only keeps track of major safety problems and overlooks routine 
ones (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).  
20. My organization is willing to change its procedures immediately if a safety concern is 
identified. 
Measurement Area 5 – The Just Culture. People are encouraged, and even rewarded, 
for providing essential safety-related information. There is a clear line that differentiates 
between acceptable and unacceptable behavior (Stolzer et al., 2008). 
 
21. My organization’s leadership shows favoritism to certain personnel (Question 
adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).  
22. Standards of accountability are consistently applied to all personnel in my 
organization (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006).  
23. When personnel make a mistake or do something wrong, they are dealt with fairly by 
management (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006). 
24. When an accident or incident happens, management immediately blames the 
personnel involved.  (Question adapted from Gibbons & von Thaden, 2006). 
25. Disciplinary policies are based on an agreed distinction between acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior.  The key determinant of blameworthiness is not so much the 
act itself—error or violation—as the nature of the behavior in which it was 
embedded. (Question adapted from Reason, Transport Canada, 2011). 
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Measurement Area 6 – Leadership.  The dynamic processes of culture creation and 
management are the essence of leadership… leadership and culture are two sides of the 
same coin (Schein, 2010). 
 
26. Leadership acknowledges the nature of the organization’s activities as high-risk and 
high-consequence (Question adapted from Stolzer et al., 2008). 
27. Safety is a core value in my organization (Question adapted from Gibbons & von 
Thaden, 2006).  
28. Leadership creates a climate of trust throughout the organization and all personnel 
believe they will be supported by the organization when they make decisions in the 
interest of safety (Question adapted from Stolzer et al., 2008). 
29. Leadership encourages the organization to actively seek hazards and safety risks and 
when those hazards are identified, prompt action is taken to investigate and mitigate 
them as practicable (Question adapted from Stolzer et al., 2008). 
30. Leadership doesn’t show much concern for safety until there is an accident, incident 
or anomaly which spotlights safety procedures (Question adapted from Gibbons & 
von Thaden, 2006).  
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APPENDIX C 
Second Pre-test Revised Safety Culture Measurement Instrument 
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APPENDIX D 
Bolman and Deal’s Leadership Orientation Instrument (Others) 
  Name of person described:_____________________ 
 
  Group code (if any): _____________________ 
 
 
LEADERSHIP ORIENTATIONS (OTHER)1 
 
This questionnaire asks you to describe the person that you are rating in terms of 
leadership and management style. 
 
I.  Leader Behaviors  
 
You are asked to indicate how often each item is true of the person that you are 
rating. 
 
Please use the following scale in answering each item. 
 
 
1   2    3   4           5 
Never      Sometimes        Always 
Occasionally      Often 
 
So, you would answer '1' for an item that is never true of the person you are 
describing, '2' for one that is occasionally true, '3' for one that is sometimes true, and 
so on. 
 
Be discriminating!  The results will be more helpful to the ratee if you think about 
each item and distinguish the things that the ratee really does all the time from the 
things that s/he does seldom or never. 
 
1. _____ Thinks very clearly and logically. 
 
2. _____ Shows high levels of support and concern for others. 
 
3. _____ Shows exceptional ability to mobilize people and resources to get things 
done. 
 
4. _____ Inspires others to do their best. 
 
                                                 
     18 1990, Lee G. Bolman and Terrence E. Deal  
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5. _____ Strongly emphasizes careful planning and clear time lines. 
 
6. _____ Builds trust through open and collaborative relationships. 
 
7. _____ Is a very skillful and shrewd negotiator. 
 
8. _____ Is highly charismatic. 
 
9. _____ Approaches problems through logical analysis and careful thinking. 
 
   10. _____ Shows high sensitivity and concern for others' needs and feelings. 
 
11. _____ Is unusually persuasive and influential. 
 
12. _____ Is an inspiration to others. 
 
13. _____ Develops and implements clear, logical policies and procedures. 
 
14. _____ Fosters high levels of participation and involvement in decisions. 
 
15. _____ Anticipates and deals adroitly with organizational conflict. 
 
16. _____ Is highly imaginative and creative. 
 
17. _____ Approaches problems with facts and logic. 
 
18. _____ Is consistently helpful and responsive to others. 
 
19. _____ Is very effective in getting support from people with influence and power. 
 
20. _____ Communicates a strong and challenging vision and sense of mission. 
 
21. _____ Sets specific, measurable goals and holds people accountable for results. 
 
22. _____ Listens well and is unusually receptive to other people's ideas and input.  
 
23. _____ Is politically very sensitive and skillful. 
 
24. _____ Sees beyond current realities to create exciting new opportunities.  
 
25. _____ Has extraordinary attention to detail. 
 
26. _____ Gives personal recognition for work well done. 
 
27. _____ Develops alliances to build a strong base of support.  
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28. _____ Generates loyalty and enthusiasm. 
 
29. _____ Strongly believes in clear structure and a chain of command.  
 
30. _____ Is a highly participative manager. 
 
31. _____ Succeeds in the face of conflict and opposition. 
 
32. _____ Serves as an influential model of organizational aspirations and values. 
 
 
I.  Leadership Style 
 
This section asks you to describe the leadership style of the person that you are rating.   
For each item, give the number "4" to the phrase that best describes this person, "3" to the 
item that is next best, and on down to "1" for the item that is least like this person. 
 
1.  The individual's strongest skills are: 
 
_____ a.    Analytic skills 
_____ b.    Interpersonal skills 
_____ c.    Political skills 
_____ d.    Ability to excite and motivate 
 
2.  The best way to describe this person is: 
 
_____ a.    Technical expert 
_____ b.    Good listener 
_____ c.    Skilled negotiator 
_____ d.    Inspirational leader 
 
3.  What this individual does best is: 
 
_____ a.  Make good decisions 
_____ b. Coach and develop people 
_____ c.  Build strong alliances and a power base   
_____ d. Energize and inspire others 
 
4.  What people are most likely to notice about this person is: 
             
_____ a. Attention to detail 
_____ b.  Concern for people 
_____ c.  Ability to succeed, in the face of conflict and opposition 
_____ d.  Charisma. 
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5.  This individual's most important leadership trait is: 
 
_____ a.  Clear, logical thinking  
_____ b.  Caring and support for others  
_____ c.  Toughness and aggressiveness 
_____ d. Imagination and creativity 
 
6.  This person is best described as: 
 
_____ a.  An analyst 
_____ b.  A humanist 
_____ c.  A politician 
_____ d.  A visionary 
 
 
III.  Overall rating 
 
Compared to other individuals that you have known with comparable levels of experience 
and responsibility, how would you rate this person on: 
 
1.  Overall effectiveness as a manager. 
 
  1   2    3   4           5 
   Bottom 20%               Middle 20%          Top 20% 
 
2.  Overall effectiveness as a leader. 
 
  1   2    3   4           5 
   Bottom 20%              Middle 20%          Top 20% 
 
IV.  Background Information 
 
The following information will not be provided to the ratee, but will contribute to our efforts 
to understand how perceptions of leadership styles are influenced by the relationship 
between rater and ratee. 
 
1.  Are you:  ____Male  ____Female 
 
2.  Which of the following best describes your work relationship with the ratee: 
 
_____ The ratee is at a higher level in the organization than I am. 
 
_____ The ratee and I are at about the same organizational level. 
 
_____ I am at a higher level in the organization than the ratee. 
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_____ I am a client or customer of the ratee's organization. 
 
_____ Other.  Please specify: _____________________ 
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Bolman Permission to Use Instrument 
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Appendix F 
 
Hypothesized SEM Model
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APPENDIX G 
ERAU IRB EXEMPTION 
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Appendix H 
 
IBAC Approval for Research 
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Appendix I 
 
Final Leadership Performance Construct CFA Model 
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Appendix J 
Final Safety Culture Perceptions Construct CFA Model 
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Appendix K 
Second Order Leadership Performance and Safety Culture Perceptions CFA 
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Appendix L 
Final SEM Model 
 
